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This	  paper	  provides	  a	  consolidated	  response	  to	  
the	  Honourable	  Lara	  Giddings	  (MP)	  and	  the	  
Honourable	  Nick	  McKim	  (MP),	  offering	  analysis	  
and	  critique	  of	  their	  ‘Voluntary	  Assisted	  Dying	  –	  
A	  Proposal	  for	  Tasmania’	  (2013)	  paper.	  Their	  
paper	  puts	  forward	  a	  radical	  proposal	  that,	  if	  
legislated,	  would	  make	  Tasmania	  one	  of	  a	  very	  
small	  number	  of	  jurisdictions	  in	  the	  world	  to	  
legalise	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide.	  	  
From	  close	  examination	  of	  their	  paper	  and	  
proposed	  model,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  while	  a	  
number	  of	  their	  claims	  are	  evidence	  based,	  
others	  are	  unsubstantiated.	  Their	  claims	  often	  
represent	  one	  perspective	  or	  type	  of	  response	  
to	  complex	  issues	  and	  questions	  –	  the	  answers	  
to	  which	  may	  never	  be	  agreed	  upon	  by	  relevant	  
stakeholders.	  	  
This	  paper	  draws	  on	  international	  literature	  as	  
well	  as	  insights	  from	  well-­‐credentialed	  
Tasmanian	  practitioners	  to	  analyse	  Giddings	  
and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  representation	  of	  what	  has	  
(and	  has	  not)	  happened	  elsewhere	  and	  to	  
critique	  their	  bid	  for	  euthanasia	  law	  reform	  in	  
Tasmania.	  	  
We	  conclude	  that	  the	  paper	  produced	  by	  Ms	  
Giddings	  and	  Mr	  McKim	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  
compelling	  evidence-­‐based	  case	  for	  changing	  
the	  law.	  The	  risks	  of	  proceeding	  with	  the	  model	  




The	  euthanasia	  debate	  is	  as	  complex	  as	  it	  is	  
controversial,	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  not	  new.	  The	  transition	  
between	  life	  and	  death,	  and	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  
of	  intervention	  and	  assistance	  (who,	  how,	  why,	  in	  
what	  circumstances)	  in	  that	  process,	  is	  of	  intrinsic	  
interest	  and	  importance	  to	  law	  makers.	  The	  
euthanasia	  debate	  is,	  in	  essence,	  a	  debate	  not	  only	  
about	  the	  purported	  ‘right	  to	  die’	  but,	  importantly,	  
whether	  doctors	  should	  be	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  
authorised	  to	  kill	  their	  patients	  or	  to	  assist	  their	  
suicide	  (see	  Jackson	  &	  Keown,	  2012;	  Putnam,	  2009).	  
Ms	  Giddings	  and	  Mr	  McKim’s	  proposal	  refers	  to	  
these	  scenarios	  as	  collectively	  ‘voluntary	  assisted	  
dying’.	  In	  this	  paper	  the	  terms	  ‘voluntary	  euthanasia’	  
and	  ‘assisted	  suicide’	  are	  used,	  which	  is	  consistent	  
with	  the	  terminology	  of	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  
this	  field.	  	  
Ms	  Giddings	  and	  Mr	  McKim	  are	  very	  clear	  in	  
approaching	  this	  as	  individual	  private	  members.	  
Nonetheless	  the	  views	  of	  significant	  Tasmanian	  
political	  figures	  on	  such	  a	  complex	  topic	  warrant	  
close	  scrutiny	  and	  deep	  reflection.	  Indeed,	  Giddings	  
and	  McKim	  (2013)	  call	  for	  community	  engagement	  
and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  spirit	  of	  respectful	  democratic	  debate	  
that	  the	  following	  response	  is	  made.	  To	  be	  clear,	  this	  
paper	  involves	  the	  analytical	  critique	  of	  ideas,	  issues	  
and	  proposed	  law	  reforms,	  not	  people	  or	  their	  
respective	  political	  parties.	  By	  framing	  the	  issues	  
here	  in	  an	  academic	  way,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  ongoing	  
public	  conversations	  can	  be	  further	  stimulated,	  
inclusive	  of	  different	  stakeholders	  and	  diverse	  
views.	  
The	  critique	  that	  follows	  highlights	  two	  substantial	  
issues	  with	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  paper	  and	  
proposed	  model.	  A	  number	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  they	  
make	  inappropriately	  imply	  concrete	  facts	  (i.e.	  
sentiments	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “the	  evidence	  has	  
spoken”	  and	  “our	  research	  shows…”)	  without	  
acknowledging	  the	  depth	  of	  international	  contention	  
on	  certain	  topics.	  	  
Secondly,	  significant	  amounts	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  
and	  alternative	  academic	  and	  professional	  
perspectives	  have	  been	  understated	  or	  omitted	  in	  
their	  paper.	  That	  evidence,	  along	  with	  the	  
implications,	  paradoxes	  and	  questions	  that	  emerge	  
for	  the	  Tasmanian	  context,	  is	  considered	  in	  this	  
response.	  We	  look	  at	  what	  is	  being	  proposed	  and	  
what	  is	  missing.	  In	  particular,	  we	  analyse	  what	  is	  
missing	  from	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	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portrayal	  of	  the	  legalisation	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  
and	  assisted	  dying	  in	  jurisdictions,	  including	  the	  
Netherlands,	  Belgium	  and	  Oregon.	  	  
Summary	  of	  the	  Key	  Issues	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  
paper	  and	  model,	  some	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  and	  
concerns	  raised	  here	  include:	  
• Multiple	  formal	  bodies	  have	  considered	  and	  
rejected	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide:	  Worldwide	  there	  have	  been	  multiple	  
commissions,	  committees,	  panels,	  and	  
parliamentary	  inquiries	  that	  have	  carefully	  
considered	  and	  decided	  against	  the	  legalisation	  
of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  
(Jackson	  &	  Keown,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  
USA	  alone,	  between	  January	  1994	  –	  March	  2011,	  
there	  were	  122	  legislative	  attempts	  to	  legalise	  
forms	  of	  euthanasia	  in	  25	  states.	  While	  Oregon	  
and	  Washington	  have	  legalised	  it,	  the	  other	  
attempts	  have	  been	  defeated	  or	  withdrawn	  
(Patient	  Rights	  Council,	  2011).	  It	  is	  still	  illegal	  in	  
Australia	  and	  most	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
• Where	  legalised,	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  
‘safeguards’	  being	  ignored:	  In	  the	  Flanders	  
region	  of	  Belgium	  approximately	  half	  of	  
euthanasia	  cases	  are	  not	  formally	  monitored	  as	  
doctors	  do	  not	  report	  them	  to	  authorities.	  	  The	  
rate	  of	  underreporting	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  
appears	  to	  be	  between	  20%-­‐23%.	  	  Also,	  in	  
Oregon	  the	  ‘safeguard’	  of	  referral	  to	  a	  
psychiatrist	  for	  mental	  health	  assessment	  to	  
consider	  issues	  of	  competency	  and	  informed	  
consent	  dropped	  from	  31%	  of	  patients	  in	  1998	  
to	  2%	  of	  patients	  in	  2012.	  Yet,	  some	  research	  
has	  indicated	  moderately	  high	  rates	  of	  
depression	  among	  Oregonian	  Death	  With	  
Dignity	  Act	  patients	  (Ganzini	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
• Where	  legalised,	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  
vulnerable	  people	  being	  euthanased	  without	  
their	  explicit	  request	  and	  informed	  consent:	  
This	  occurs	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium,	  and	  
Oregon,	  and	  the	  list	  of	  vulnerable	  patients	  being	  
euthanased	  (with	  or	  without	  their	  consent)	  
include	  infants	  and	  children,	  disabled	  people,	  
people	  who	  are	  economically	  disadvantaged,	  and	  
people	  with	  a	  mental	  illnesses.	  In	  Oregon,	  there	  
are	  documented	  cases	  of	  the	  State	  suggesting	  to	  
financially	  disadvantaged	  people	  that	  physician	  
assisted	  suicide	  was	  a	  ‘treatment’	  option	  after	  
their	  request	  for	  other	  options	  (e.g.	  cancer	  
treatment)	  was	  denied	  (Page,	  2009).	  	  
• There	  are	  risks	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide	  negatively	  impacting	  on	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationship:	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  claim	  that	  there	  will	  
be	  no	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  doctor-­‐patient	  
relationships.	  Many	  academic	  journal	  articles	  
take	  the	  opposite	  view.	  Doctors	  and	  medical	  
associations	  around	  the	  world	  have	  expressed	  
their	  concerns	  and	  opposition	  to	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  for	  multiple	  
reasons;	  the	  Australian	  Medical	  Association	  
(Tas.)	  (2009,	  2013)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  
critics	  of	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  paper	  
and	  proposed	  model.	  	  
• Doctors,	  health	  care	  workers	  and	  family	  
members	  may	  suffer	  unforeseen	  stress	  after	  
being	  involved	  in	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide:	  There	  is	  research	  that	  has	  
found	  that	  some	  people	  who	  have	  been	  involved	  
with	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  
may	  have	  mixed	  feelings	  or	  be	  emotionally	  and	  
psychologically	  burdened	  by	  the	  experience	  
after	  the	  fact	  (for	  example,	  see	  Campbell	  &	  Black,	  
2013;	  Stevens,	  2006;	  Haverkate	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  
• If	  legalised,	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  for	  who	  can	  
access	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide	  is	  open	  to	  contest	  and	  risks	  being	  
expanded	  to	  include	  vulnerable	  people:	  This	  
is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘bracket	  creep’	  and	  is	  the	  subject	  
of	  discussion	  in	  the	  ‘International	  Evidence	  and	  
History	  Re-­‐Visited’	  section.	  	  	  
• Many	  disability	  advocates	  and	  organisations	  
around	  the	  world	  oppose	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide:	  They	  argue	  against	  it	  on	  a	  
number	  of	  grounds,	  but	  first	  and	  foremost	  
because	  it	  has	  adverse	  implications	  for	  people	  
with	  disabilities	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  eligible	  
for	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  
The	  implication	  that	  some	  people	  are	  ‘better	  off	  
dead’	  and	  that	  ‘some	  lives	  are	  not	  worth	  living,	  
phrases	  which	  have	  been	  used	  internationally	  in	  
euthanasia	  debates,	  are	  potentially	  offensive	  and	  
stigmatising	  to	  those	  who	  live	  with	  the	  same	  or	  
similar	  symptoms	  and	  conditions.	  This	  is	  







This	  paper	  considers	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  
paper	  and	  proposed	  model	  by	  focusing	  on	  a	  series	  of	  
specific	  but	  inter-­‐related	  contexts:	  
• Academic	  issues	  and	  critiques	  
• Medical	  and	  bioethical	  issues	  and	  critiques	  
• Legal	  and	  criminological	  issues	  and	  critiques	  
• Social	  and	  political	  issues	  and	  critiques	  
By	  their	  very	  nature,	  these	  contexts	  and	  categories	  
are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive	  but	  instead	  inform	  each	  
other.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  
scope	  of	  this	  response	  is	  bounded	  and	  prioritised,	  
limiting	  discussions	  and	  critique	  to	  the	  key	  issues.	  	  
We	  make	  no	  claims	  of	  having	  universally	  and	  
comprehensively	  surveyed	  all	  of	  the	  literature,	  nor	  is	  
it	  reasonable	  or	  commonplace	  to	  expect	  that	  in	  the	  
format	  of	  a	  response.	  	  
Defining	  Meaning	  and	  Key	  Terms	  
Multiple	  terms	  are	  used	  in	  this	  field,	  such	  as	  
‘voluntary	  assisted	  dying’,	  ‘dying	  with	  dignity’,	  
‘therapeutic	  homicide’,	  ‘therapeutic	  killing’	  (Flegel	  
and	  Fletcher,	  2012;	  George,	  Finlay	  &	  Jeffrey,	  2005),	  
‘physician	  assisted	  suicide’,	  and	  ‘mercy	  killing’.	  	  Key	  













Table	  1:	  Terms	  and	  definitions	  




Actions	  taken	  by	  medical	  professionals	  
with	  the	  primary	  intention	  of	  causing	  a	  
patient’s	  death	  with	  the	  patient’s	  





A	  suicide	  which	  is	  aided	  by	  a	  medical	  
professional	  who	  intends	  to	  aid	  or	  





Actions	  taken	  by	  medical	  professionals	  
with	  the	  primary	  intention	  of	  causing	  a	  
patient’s	  death	  without	  the	  patient’s	  
request	  or	  without	  informed	  consent.	  
	   	  





& MCKIM 	  
	  
Throughout	  this	  response,	  we	  will	  refer	  to	  Lara	  
Giddings	  (MP)	  and	  Nick	  McKim	  (MP)	  as	  ‘Giddings	  and	  
McKim’,	  as	  is	  tradition	  in	  academic	  responses	  to	  
papers	  by	  other	  authors.	  	  
In	  their	  paper,	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  
accurately	  outline	  certain	  key	  findings	  and	  
recommendations	  from	  recent	  commissions	  and	  
reviews	  from	  Quebec,	  Canada	  and	  the	  UK	  regarding	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  They	  
quote	  large	  portions	  of	  individual	  submissions	  and	  
viewpoints	  from	  those	  commissions	  and	  reviews	  
throughout	  their	  paper.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  they	  
provide	  appendices	  of	  numerical	  data	  and	  
operational	  statistics	  from	  Oregon	  and	  the	  
Netherlands.	  	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  also	  extensively	  draw	  upon	  two	  
Australian	  pieces	  –	  an	  academic	  journal	  article	  by	  
Bartels	  and	  Otlowski	  (2010)	  and	  the	  background	  
paper	  by	  White	  and	  Willmott	  (2012)	  published	  by	  
Australia21.	  	  
However,	  to	  conclude	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  five	  
sources	  that	  the	  euthanasia	  debate	  is	  settled	  is	  
expeditious.	  Among	  other	  things,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  
demonstrate	  that:	  the	  euthanasia	  debate	  has	  many	  
complex	  and	  unresolved	  dimensions;	  data	  do	  indeed	  
exist	  that	  do	  not	  support	  the	  legalisation	  of	  
euthanasia;	  and	  recent	  judicial	  consideration	  of	  
central	  issues	  in	  the	  debate	  have	  not	  supported	  the	  
case	  for	  legalisation.	  	  
	  
Academic	  Issues	  and	  Critiques	  	  	  
It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  proponents	  of	  law	  reform	  
to	  present	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  
empirical	  evidence.	  While	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
(2013)	  strongly	  assert	  that	  this	  is	  what	  they	  have	  
done,	  closer	  analysis	  unearths	  some	  limitations	  in	  
their	  paper	  that	  can	  be	  outlined	  here.	  	  
The	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  paper	  is	  not	  as	  well	  
researched	  as	  the	  authors	  intimate.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  
why	  readily	  available	  and	  recent	  sources	  have	  been	  
omitted	  from	  their	  paper.	  Examples	  include	  Jackson	  
and	  Keown	  (2012),	  Downie,	  Chambaere,	  and	  
Bernheim	  (2012),	  Quill	  (2012),	  Werren,	  Yuksel,	  and	  
Smith	  (2012)	  and	  Gill	  (2010),	  among	  many	  others.	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  standard	  that	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
(2013)	  set	  for	  acceptable	  research	  are	  applied	  
inconsistently.	  For	  example,	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
rejecting	  as	  unreliable	  or	  invalid	  ‘unsubstantiated	  
anecdotes’	  from	  those	  who	  argue	  against	  law	  reform	  
(2013:	  20).	  Surely	  then,	  this	  applies	  to	  the	  ‘heart	  
wrenching	  stories	  of	  people	  suffering	  at	  the	  end-­‐of-­‐
life	  because	  of	  their	  symptoms’	  (2013:	  16)	  that	  they	  
and	  others	  use	  to	  support	  their	  rationale?	  It	  seems	  
inconsistent	  that	  the	  favourable	  anecdotes	  and	  
stories	  of	  doctors,	  carers,	  patients	  and	  their	  families	  
testifying	  to	  the	  international	  committees	  and	  
reviews	  are	  quoted	  extensively	  in	  the	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim	  (2013)	  paper,	  and	  yet	  the	  opinions,	  
anecdotes	  and	  stories	  of	  others	  with	  alternative	  or	  
opposing	  views	  somehow	  do	  not	  count.	  The	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  debate	  is	  
full	  of	  stories	  and	  subjectivities	  (for	  more,	  see	  
Kamisar’s	  (1998)	  reflections	  on	  ‘the	  problems	  
presented	  by	  the	  compelling	  heart-­‐wrenching	  case’).	  
In	  an	  academic	  context,	  qualitative	  data	  and	  peoples’	  
experiences	  are	  treated	  with	  caution	  but	  are	  not	  
rejected	  as	  ‘unsubstantiated	  anecdotes’.	  Rather	  they	  
can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  valuable	  form	  of	  information,	  
alongside	  statistics	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  evidence	  and	  
knowledge.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  political	  context	  of	  
Tasmania	  as	  a	  democracy,	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  the	  
stories	  and	  subjectivities	  of	  some	  should	  be	  rejected	  
as	  unsubstantiated	  anecdotes,	  while	  those	  of	  others	  
are	  accepted	  as	  valid	  reasons	  why	  the	  law	  and	  social	  
norms	  need	  to	  change.	  	  
Another	  example	  is	  their	  rejection	  of	  claims	  that	  are	  
dependent	  on	  ‘poor	  quality	  information,	  particularly	  
information	  from	  the	  1990s	  but	  also	  pre-­‐2009,	  that	  
is	  now	  well	  out	  of	  date	  and	  does	  not	  reflect	  any	  of	  
the	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  following	  legislative	  
reform	  and	  recent	  reviews’	  (2013:	  19).	  It	  is	  unclear,	  
outside	  of	  political	  reasons,	  how	  and	  why	  the	  world	  
and	  the	  issues	  have	  changed	  considerably	  since	  
2009.	  This	  particular	  year	  is	  not	  a	  standard	  cut-­‐off	  or	  
threshold	  in	  academia,	  nor	  is	  it	  necessarily	  reflected	  
as	  a	  meaningful	  date	  in	  the	  deliberations	  of	  the	  




The	  authors	  (2013:	  19)	  refer	  to	  ‘many	  years’	  of	  
experience	  and	  evidence	  from	  jurisdictions	  that	  have	  
legalised	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  physician	  
assisted	  suicide	  (e.g.	  in	  Oregon	  since	  1997	  and	  in	  
Belgium	  since	  2002)	  and	  yet	  claims	  made	  by	  
opponents	  and	  others	  that	  use	  evidence	  and	  
experience	  pre-­‐dating	  2009	  is	  ‘now	  well	  out	  of	  date.’	  
In	  the	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  paper,	  84	  of	  their	  
endnotes	  and	  just	  under	  half	  (24/54)	  of	  the	  
references	  in	  their	  bibliography	  refer	  to	  literature	  
and	  legislation	  that	  pre-­‐date	  2009.	  Furthermore,	  in	  
the	  Bartels	  and	  Otlowski	  (2010)	  article	  that	  Giddings	  
and	  McKim	  (2013)	  cite	  frequently,	  no	  books	  or	  
journal	  articles	  from	  2009	  or	  more	  recently	  are	  
referenced;	  instead,	  the	  Bartels	  and	  Otlowski	  article	  
largely	  cites	  sources	  from	  the	  1970s	  –	  1990s.	  This	  
issue	  is	  not	  of	  particular	  concern	  to	  us	  here,	  as	  we	  
recognise	  the	  Bartels	  and	  Otlowski	  (2010)	  article	  as	  
a	  useful	  academic	  contribution	  irrespective	  of	  what	  
year	  its	  references	  date	  from.	  These	  are,	  however,	  
examples	  of	  rules	  and	  standards	  being	  applied	  to	  
opponents	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide	  as	  grounds	  to	  reject	  their	  views	  which	  are	  
not	  consistently	  applied	  to	  supporters	  and	  
proponents.	  	  
Considering	  what	  else	  is	  missing	  raises	  the	  question	  
of	  why	  the	  Australian	  example	  of	  the	  Northern	  
Territory	  is	  largely	  omitted,	  yet	  overseas	  examples	  
are	  featured	  throughout?	  On	  this,	  we	  concur	  with	  
their	  statement	  about	  the	  absence	  of	  critically	  
relevant	  information	  and	  that	  ‘what	  is	  missing	  is	  just	  
as	  important	  as	  what	  is	  included’	  (2013:	  19).	  The	  
authors	  of	  the	  Australia21	  papers	  discuss	  the	  
Northern	  Territory	  laws	  and	  data	  alongside	  those	  
from	  overseas	  jurisdictions	  (see	  White	  &	  Willmott,	  
2012;	  Douglas,	  Willmott	  &	  White,	  2013),	  so	  it	  
remains	  unclear	  why	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  have	  not	  
done	  so?	  One	  possible	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  
Terminally	  Ill	  Act	  in	  the	  Northern	  Territory	  (NT)	  was	  
repealed	  in	  1997	  –	  less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  coming	  into	  
effect	  –	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Australian	  federal	  
parliament	  (Plattner,	  1997).	  Another	  possible	  reason	  
is	  the	  problematic	  implications	  of	  the	  research	  
finding	  that	  ‘symptoms	  of	  depression	  were	  common’	  
among	  NT	  patients	  seeking	  help	  to	  end	  their	  lives	  
(Kissane,	  Street	  &	  Nitschke,	  1998:	  1097).	  
Their	  paper	  does	  not	  define	  some	  important	  terms	  
(mentioned	  throughout	  this	  paper),	  while	  others	  are	  
defined	  loosely.	  It	  is	  to	  issues	  of	  contested	  
definitions	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn.	  
MEDICAL & BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES AND CRITIQUES 	  
Define	  ‘terminal’	  
One	  of	  the	  issues	  in	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  
paper	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  terminal	  illness	  and	  whether	  
or	  not	  it	  should	  take	  into	  account	  life	  expectancy,	  
actual	  and	  anticipated	  suffering,	  and	  quality	  of	  life.	  
The	  international	  literature	  suggests	  diversity	  and	  
ambiguity	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘terminal’	  and	  
‘terminally	  ill’,	  a	  point	  which	  is	  well	  illustrated	  in	  the	  
examples	  given	  below	  and	  in	  a	  more	  detailed	  
analysis	  by	  Hui	  and	  colleagues	  (2012:	  588),	  where	  
‘terminally	  ill’	  is	  defined	  as:	  
• ‘a	  life	  expectancy	  of	  six	  months	  or	  less’	  
(Meghani,	  2004)	  
• ‘less	  than	  six	  months	  to	  live’	  (Babgi,	  2009;	  
Schroepfer	  &	  Noh,	  2010)	  
• ‘life	  expectancy	  less	  than	  three	  months’	  (Proot	  et	  
al.,	  2004)	  
• ‘patients	  with	  an	  anticipated	  prognosis	  of	  three	  
months	  or	  less’	  (Napolskikh	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  
• ‘the	  term	  ‘terminal’	  should	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  
dying	  patient,	  with	  a	  short	  life	  expectancy	  of	  a	  
few	  days	  to	  a	  week’	  (Rogg	  et	  al.,	  2006:	  277).	  
To	  add	  to	  the	  confusion,	  ‘end	  of	  life	  care’	  can	  be	  
understood	  to	  be	  anywhere	  from	  one	  to	  two	  years	  of	  
life	  expectancy	  through	  to	  ‘the	  last	  few	  hours	  or	  days	  
of	  life’	  (The	  European	  Association	  for	  Palliative	  Care	  
2009	  cited	  in	  Izumi	  et	  al.,	  2012:	  609).	  	  
Rogg,	  Graugaard	  and	  Loge	  (2006)	  conducted	  a	  
survey	  of	  968	  Norwegian	  physicians,	  where	  
respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  define	  ‘terminal’	  in	  
expected	  number	  of	  weeks	  left	  to	  live.	  The	  results	  
showed	  that,	  on	  average,	  Norwegian	  physicians	  
expect	  a	  ‘terminal’	  patient	  to	  have	  3.6	  weeks	  to	  live,	  
with	  the	  majority	  (83.5%)	  restricting	  the	  definition	  
of	  ‘terminal’	  to	  the	  last	  2-­‐4	  weeks	  of	  a	  patient’s	  life	  
(Rogg	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  273).	  	  
In	  Oregon	  and	  in	  Washington	  under	  their	  respective	  
laws,	  a	  patient	  must	  be	  living	  with	  a	  terminal	  illness	  
that	  will	  lead	  to	  death	  or	  be	  reasonably	  expected	  to	  
lead	  to	  death	  within	  six	  months	  (Oregon	  Health	  
Authority,	  n.d.;	  Washington	  State	  Department	  of	  
Health,	  n.d.).	  Whereas,	  the	  Australian	  Medical	  
Association	  (AMA)	  (2007)	  defines	  ‘terminal	  illness’	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within	  the	  timeframe	  of	  ‘within	  a	  few	  months	  at	  
most’:	  	  
	  ‘An	  illness	  which	  is	  inevitably	  progressive,	  the	  
effects	  of	  which	  cannot	  be	  reversed	  by	  treatment	  
(although	  treatment	  may	  be	  successful	  in	  relieving	  
symptoms	  temporarily)	  and	  which	  will	  inevitably	  
result	  in	  death	  within	  a	  few	  months	  at	  most.	  
Terminal	  phase	  of	  a	  terminal	  illness	  is	  defined	  as	  
the	  phase	  of	  the	  illness	  reached	  when	  there	  is	  no	  
real	  prospect	  of	  recovery,	  or	  remission	  of	  symptoms	  
(on	  either	  a	  temporary	  or	  permanent	  basis).’	  
Others	  have	  systematically	  analysed	  the	  varying	  
definitions	  and	  lack	  of	  consensus	  in	  the	  international	  
literature	  surrounding	  the	  terms	  ‘terminally	  ill’,	  
‘palliative	  care’	  and	  the	  implications	  and	  challenges	  
that	  arise	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  ambiguity	  about	  who	  might	  
be	  defined	  as	  a	  palliative	  care	  patient	  (see	  Mitchell	  et	  
al.,	  2013;	  Hui	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Izumi	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Van	  
Mechelen	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
In	  mid-­‐2103,	  this	  exact	  issue	  arose	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  new	  
critique	  of	  Lord	  Falconer’s	  assisted	  dying	  bill	  
(currently	  under	  consideration	  by	  Parliament	  there)	  
by	  academics	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Oxford.	  
Sheehan,	  Dunn	  and	  Horn	  (2013)	  state	  that	  the	  bill	  
‘smacks	  of	  compromise’	  because	  of	  ‘poorly	  defined	  
and	  articulated’	  concepts,	  arguing	  that	  ‘it	  is	  neither	  
adequate	  nor	  coherent	  in	  its	  current	  form.’	  They	  
consider	  the	  issues	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  bill	  centre	  
on	  the	  lack	  of	  clarity	  in	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  terminal	  
illness,	  saying	  that	  ‘there	  looks	  to	  be	  no	  good	  reason	  
for	  the	  “six	  months	  to	  live”	  limit’.	  They	  instead	  call	  it	  
‘arbitrary’	  and	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  recommended	  12	  
months	  to	  live	  in	  the	  final	  report	  of	  the	  Commission	  
on	  Assisted	  Dying.	  	  
Sheehan,	  Dunn	  and	  Horn	  (2013)	  highlight	  the	  
inconsistencies	  and	  ethical	  problems	  that	  arise	  when	  
laws	  use	  vague	  language	  and	  broad	  categories	  to	  
define	  key	  issues	  (e.g.	  terminal	  illness)	  while,	  at	  the	  
same	  time,	  strictly	  limit	  eligibility	  and	  availability	  
through	  short	  arbitrary	  timelines	  and	  other	  strict	  
criteria.	  In	  arguing	  that	  Lord	  Falconer’s	  bill	  needs	  to	  
be	  clearer,	  they	  conclude	  that	  ‘concepts	  are	  defined	  
in	  ways	  that	  don’t	  stand	  up	  to	  scrutiny,	  and	  moral	  
judgments	  are	  imposed	  in	  ways	  that	  diverge	  from	  
the	  main	  reasons	  given	  to	  support	  changes	  in	  the	  
law.’	  This	  conclusion	  must	  apply	  largely	  to	  the	  terms	  
put	  forward	  by	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  because	  
of	  their	  similarity	  to	  the	  terms	  used	  by	  Lord	  
Falconer.	  
Healer,	  Helper,	  Killer?	  The	  Role	  of	  
the	  Doctor	  and	  Potential	  Risks	  for	  
Doctor-­‐Patient	  Relationships	  
In	  considering	  the	  role	  of	  the	  doctor,	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim	  (2013:	  22-­‐23)	  take	  a	  selective	  view	  of	  the	  
perspectives	  and	  practices	  involved.	  They	  ‘believe	  
that	  those	  arguing	  against	  voluntary	  assisted	  dying	  
law	  reform	  have	  failed	  to	  substantiate	  perceived	  
threats…	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  doctor	  or	  to	  the	  doctor-­‐
patient	  relationship’	  (2013:	  9).	  They	  go	  on	  to	  state	  
that:	  
A	  further	  fear	  expressed	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  doctor	  
in	  a	  legislated	  system	  of	  voluntary	  assisted	  dying	  is	  
the	  damage	  that	  could	  be	  caused	  to	  the	  relationship	  
of	  trust	  between	  a	  doctor	  and	  his	  or	  her	  patient,	  
should	  a	  doctor	  actively	  participate	  by	  providing	  
assistance.	  We	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  any	  evidence	  that	  
this	  damage	  has	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  voluntary	  
assisted	  dying	  legislation	  that	  has	  now	  been	  in	  place	  
for	  many	  years.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  indications	  that	  it	  
has	  not	  occurred	  (Giddings	  &	  McKim,	  2013:	  22).	  
Yet	  they	  do	  not	  address	  the	  local	  and	  international	  
literature	  on	  the	  diversity	  of	  professional	  opinions	  
amongst	  clinicians	  (see	  Somerville,	  2003;	  Dobscha	  et	  
al.,	  2004;	  George	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Girbes,	  2005;	  Saunders,	  
2008;	  Gamester	  &	  Van	  den	  Eynden,	  2009;	  Nitschke	  &	  
Stewart,	  2011;	  Pereira,	  2011;	  McLeod,	  2012;	  Scher,	  
2012;	  ABC	  News	  2013a,	  2013b)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
concerns	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  by	  clinicians	  and	  
scholars	  about	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  legalising	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  on	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  doctor	  and	  on	  patient	  care	  (see	  Foley,	  1997;	  
Hendin	  &	  Foley,	  2008;	  Varghese	  &	  Kelly,	  2001;	  
Stephenson,	  2006;	  Cooling,	  2009;	  Dunne,	  2009;	  
Lowenthal,	  2009;	  Saunders,	  2010;	  Randall	  &	  
Downie,	  2010).	  Some	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  these	  studies	  
certainly	  sit	  in	  tension	  with	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  
(2013)	  claims	  because	  they	  demonstrate	  that	  large	  
numbers	  of	  professionals	  may	  oppose	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  	  
Indications	  of	  mixed	  feelings	  and	  mixed	  results	  can	  
be	  seen	  the	  work	  of	  Dobscha	  and	  colleagues	  (2004).	  
They	  studied	  physicians	  in	  Oregon	  who	  had	  received	  
requests	  for	  assisted	  suicide	  in	  the	  years	  after	  the	  
Death	  with	  Dignity	  laws	  were	  enacted.	  In	  
investigating	  doctors’	  perspectives	  on	  the	  




challenges	  and	  negative	  impact	  on	  them,	  the	  study	  
found	  that:	  
Requests	  for	  assisted	  suicide	  had	  a	  powerful	  impact	  
on	  physicians	  and	  their	  practices.	  Physicians	  often	  
felt	  unprepared,	  and	  experienced	  apprehension	  and	  
discomfort	  before	  and	  after	  receiving	  requests.	  
Prominent	  sources	  of	  discomfort	  included	  concerns	  
about	  adequately	  managing	  symptoms	  and	  
suffering,	  not	  wanting	  to	  abandon	  patients,	  and	  
incomplete	  understanding	  of	  patients'	  preferences,	  
especially	  when	  physicians	  did	  not	  know	  patients	  
well.	  Participation	  in	  assisted	  suicide	  required	  a	  
large	  investment	  of	  time	  and	  was	  emotionally	  
intense.	  (Dobscha	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  451).	  
The	  opposition	  of	  significant	  proportions	  of	  the	  
medical	  fraternity	  has	  been	  an	  influential	  factor	  in	  
jurisdictions	  that	  are	  considering	  or	  have	  rejected	  
proposed	  law	  reforms.	  In	  the	  UK,	  national	  survey	  
research	  shows	  that	  most	  doctors	  do	  not	  support	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  or	  physician-­‐assisted	  suicide	  
(Seale,	  2006,	  2009).	  In	  addition,	  Seale	  (2006,	  2009)	  
discounts	  the	  argument	  that	  so	  many	  doctors	  hold	  
such	  views	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  legal	  liability.	  The	  finding	  
that	  doctors	  are	  largely	  opposed	  to	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  is	  again	  upheld	  in	  a	  systematic	  literature	  
review	  by	  McCormack	  and	  colleagues	  (2011),	  who	  
used	  meta-­‐analytic	  methodology	  to	  analyse	  
empirical	  research	  of	  doctor’s	  views	  of	  these	  issues	  
over	  a	  period	  of	  20	  years.	  They	  found	  that	  across	  the	  
research	  studies	  reviewed,	  the	  majority	  of	  UK	  
doctors	  oppose	  active	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
physician-­‐assisted	  suicide.	  	  
More	  recently,	  the	  Canadian	  Medical	  Association	  
(2013:	  357)	  conducted	  a	  survey	  completed	  by	  2,125	  
of	  its	  members,	  finding	  that	  ‘only	  20%	  would	  be	  
willing	  to	  participate	  if	  euthanasia	  is	  legalised	  in	  
Canada,	  while	  twice	  as	  many	  (42%)	  would	  refuse	  to	  
do	  so.	  Almost	  a	  quarter	  of	  respondents	  (23%)	  are	  
not	  sure	  how	  they	  would	  respond,	  while	  15%	  did	  
not	  answer.’	  The	  statistics	  were	  similar	  for	  physician	  
assisted	  suicide,	  with	  16%	  of	  respondents	  reported	  
that	  they	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  participate,	  while	  44%	  
indicated	  that	  they	  would	  refuse	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
In	  summary,	  the	  professional	  and	  personal	  
perspectives	  of	  doctors	  are	  mixed	  and	  varied,	  with	  
fairly	  consistent	  majorities	  opposing	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  
Paradoxically,	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  willingly	  
refer	  to	  the	  Australian	  Medical	  Association’s	  (AMA)	  
Code	  of	  Ethics	  (2006)	  as	  being	  more	  relevant	  and	  
replacing	  the	  Hippocratic	  Oath,	  and	  yet	  they	  ignore	  
or	  omit	  the	  policy	  positions	  and	  the	  current	  publicly	  
expressed	  views	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	  AMA.	  The	  
perspectives	  of	  the	  professionals	  tasked	  with	  the	  
practice	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  
are	  considered	  highly	  relevant,	  and	  worth	  exploring	  
in	  detail	  here.	  In	  response	  to	  a	  question	  about	  the	  
views	  of	  the	  AMA	  and	  doctors	  in	  Australia,	  Dr.	  
Andrew	  Pesce	  (2010),	  president	  of	  the	  Australian	  
Medical	  Association	  in	  2010,	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  the	  
ABC	  offered	  a	  considered	  response,	  summing	  up	  a	  
policy	  position	  and	  set	  of	  beliefs	  that	  does	  not	  
supporting	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  or	  physician	  
assisted	  suicide:	  
Our	  response	  is	  rooted,	  I	  suppose,	  in	  our	  very	  
strongly	  held	  values	  that	  our	  duty	  is	  to	  preserve	  and	  
promote	  life,	  not	  walking	  away	  from	  our	  obligations	  
to	  provide	  care	  for	  patients,	  even	  those	  that	  are	  
dying.	  Even	  though	  there	  are	  always	  examples	  at	  
the	  margins,	  I	  think	  our	  current	  system	  allows	  
doctors	  to	  do	  that	  reasonably	  well	  (Pesce,	  2010).	  
Dr.	  Christopher	  Middleton	  (2012),	  then	  chairman	  
and	  now	  ex-­‐officio	  chair	  of	  the	  council	  of	  the	  
Tasmanian	  branch	  of	  the	  AMA,	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  
the	  ABC	  in	  2012	  also	  opposed	  voluntary	  euthanasia,	  
saying	  that	  legalising	  euthanasia	  would	  compromise	  
the	  doctor’s	  role	  as	  healer.	  Opposition	  to	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  has	  consistently	  
been	  the	  position	  of	  the	  AMA	  Tasmania	  (2009;	  
2013),	  whose	  most	  recent	  response	  to	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim	  (2013)	  employs	  strongly	  worded	  censure	  to	  
convey	  the	  gravity	  of	  concern:	  	  
We	  are	  extremely	  disappointed	  in	  the	  arguments	  
set	  forth	  in	  the	  Consultation	  Paper	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  doctor	  (pages	  22-­‐23)…	  You	  fail	  to	  inform	  
the	  Tasmanian	  public,	  and	  others,	  that	  the	  majority	  
of	  national	  medical	  associations	  and	  medical	  
organisations	  around	  the	  world	  continue	  to	  oppose	  
doctors’	  involvement	  in	  assisted	  dying.	  Further,	  you	  
claim	  that	  trust	  in	  the	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationship	  
will	  not	  be	  undermined	  should	  doctors	  participate	  
in	  assisted	  dying	  but	  you	  only	  provide	  one	  citation	  
to	  support	  this	  claim	  (page	  22).	  We	  believe	  that	  to	  
fundamentally	  change	  the	  role	  of	  the	  doctor	  as	  one	  
who	  supports	  life	  to	  one	  who	  takes	  life	  will	  have	  
profound,	  unpredictable	  effects	  on	  the	  perception	  
and	  practice	  of	  medicine.	  Whilst	  we	  acknowledge	  
the	  efforts	  put	  in	  to	  developing	  your	  Consultation	  
Paper,	  we	  find	  it	  does	  not	  openly	  and	  objectively	  
invite	  opposing	  views	  and	  opinions,	  which	  is	  
contrary	  to	  the	  democratic	  process	  by	  which	  we	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live,	  nor	  does	  it	  sufficiently	  support	  its	  own	  
arguments	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  doctor.	  
(Australian	  Medical	  Association	  (TAS),	  2013:	  2-­‐3)	  
The	  AMA	  Tasmania	  (2013:	  1)	  is	  categorical	  in	  its	  
position:	  ‘medical	  practitioners	  should	  not	  be	  
involved	  in	  interventions	  that	  have	  as	  their	  primary	  
intention	  the	  ending	  of	  a	  person’s	  life	  (this	  does	  not	  
include	  the	  discontinuation	  of	  futile	  treatment).’	  In	  
keeping	  with	  this,	  other	  state	  and	  territory	  branches	  
of	  the	  Australian	  Medical	  Association	  have	  also	  been	  
active	  in	  opposing	  the	  legalisation	  of	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide,	  for	  example	  South	  
Australia	  (AMA	  SA,	  2011)	  and	  Western	  Australia	  
(Barich,	  2010).	  The	  Australian	  Medical	  Association’s	  
position	  is	  backed	  up	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  position	  
statements,	  codes	  of	  practice	  and	  codes	  of	  ethics	  of	  
medical	  associations	  around	  the	  world	  (see,	  for	  
example,	  World	  Medical	  Association,	  2005;	  British	  
Medical	  Association,	  2013;	  Canadian	  Medical	  
Association,	  2007;	  New	  Zealand	  Medical	  Association,	  
2013;	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  1996a,	  1996b).	  	  
In	  summary,	  these	  positions	  and	  statements	  not	  only	  
warrant	  further	  consideration	  and	  consultation,	  they	  
directly	  contradict	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  
portrayal	  of	  opponents	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide	  as	  a	  relatively	  ill	  informed	  group	  of	  
lay	  citizens.	  	  
	  
Supposed	  Benefits	  for	  Tasmania	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013:	  28-­‐29)	  make	  some	  
strong	  claims	  about	  the	  benefits	  and	  outcomes	  of	  
their	  proposed	  model,	  stating	  that	  ‘the	  model	  we	  
have	  developed	  is	  designed	  to	  achieve	  a	  number	  of	  
other	  positive	  outcomes,	  including:	  	  
• Encouraging	  frank	  and	  open	  conversations	  that	  improve	  
the	  provision	  of	  information	  and	  communication	  
between	  the	  doctor	  and	  the	  patient	  around	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  
expectations.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  improve	  doctor-­‐patient	  
relationships.	  
• Helping	  patients	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
different	  care	  and	  treatment	  options	  they	  have	  available	  
to	  them.	  This	  will	  assist	  the	  patient	  to	  have	  their	  fears	  
allayed	  and	  help	  address	  any	  misunderstandings.	  
• Providing	  a	  greater	  understanding	  and	  awareness	  of	  the	  
role	  and	  scope	  of	  palliative	  care	  and	  how	  it	  can	  help	  the	  
patient.	  
• Increasing	  awareness	  and	  reinforcing	  of	  the	  legal	  rights	  
of	  Tasmanians	  to	  make	  important	  choices	  about	  their	  
health	  and	  personal	  care.	  These	  choices	  include	  the	  right	  
to	  refuse	  medical	  treatment	  or	  to	  withdraw	  from	  medical	  
treatment,	  to	  make	  wills,	  appoint	  an	  Enduring	  Guardian,	  
give	  someone	  they	  trust	  Power	  of	  Attorney,	  and	  make	  an	  
Advance	  Care	  directive.	  
• Providing	  legal	  and	  professional	  guidance	  and	  support	  
doctors	  who	  receive	  requests	  from	  their	  patients	  for	  
assistance	  to	  die	  and	  who	  want	  to	  respond	  legally	  and	  
responsibly	  to	  provide	  such	  assistance	  in	  line	  with	  their	  
ethical	  and	  professional	  judgment.	  
• Providing	  legal	  and	  medical	  professional	  oversight	  of	  
end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐making	  with	  careful	  monitoring	  and	  
ongoing	  review.	  
• Improving	  respect	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  law	  by	  aligning	  
it	  more	  closely	  with	  community	  opinion	  and	  
expectations.’	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  the	  first	  four	  claims,	  it	  is	  expeditious	  to	  
say	  that	  the	  proposed	  model	  will	  improve	  these	  
things,	  especially	  without	  substantiating	  what	  is	  
meant	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  implied	  significant	  issues	  in	  
current	  medical	  practice.	  There	  is	  nothing	  to	  stop	  
Tasmanian	  doctors	  communicating	  clearly	  and	  
providing	  clear	  and	  accurate	  information	  to	  their	  
patients	  about	  available	  treatment	  options	  
(including	  ‘frank	  and	  open	  conversations’)	  under	  
Tasmanian	  law	  as	  it	  currently	  stands.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  
part	  of	  a	  doctor’s	  professional	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  do	  
these	  things,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  is	  legalised.	  	  
In	  making	  these	  claims,	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  have	  
not	  sufficiently	  demonstrated	  (a)	  that	  there	  are	  
identifiable	  and	  substantiated	  issues	  in	  Tasmanian	  
patients	  not	  being	  informed	  or	  being	  misinformed	  of	  
their	  legal	  rights,	  or	  (b)	  how	  their	  proposed	  model	  
will	  increase	  the	  awareness	  and	  autonomy	  of	  
Tasmanian	  patients	  to	  exercise	  these	  rights,	  as	  they	  
are	  already	  available	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  
necessitate	  or	  provide	  any	  additional	  rationale	  for	  
law	  reform.	  	  
Similarly,	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  
and	  scope	  of	  palliative	  care	  in	  Tasmania	  already	  
exists,	  and	  can,	  if	  needed,	  be	  strengthened	  in	  ways	  
that	  are	  independent	  and	  irrespective	  of	  any	  
proposed	  model	  or	  legislation.	  Therefore,	  if	  Giddings	  
and	  McKim	  are	  aware	  of	  systemic	  issues	  of	  
professional	  malpractice	  amongst	  doctors	  or	  failures	  
in	  duty	  of	  care	  to	  provide	  accurate	  and	  clear	  
information	  or	  to	  support	  patient	  rights,	  they	  need	  
to	  substantiate	  these	  concerns	  and	  to	  work	  with	  the	  
relevant	  authorities	  and	  the	  Tasmanian	  medical	  
fraternity	  to	  remedy	  the	  issues	  they	  imply	  exist.	  The	  




likely	  be	  addressed	  through	  professional	  and	  
workforce	  development	  mechanisms	  that	  do	  not	  
require	  the	  legalisation	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  or	  
assisted	  suicide.	  	  
Regarding	  the	  latter	  three	  claims	  in	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim’s	  list,	  Tasmanian	  doctors	  should	  already	  have	  
access	  to	  legal	  and	  professional	  guidance	  regarding	  
any	  matter	  of	  practice,	  and	  should	  comply	  with	  
routine	  professional	  protocols,	  clinical	  guidelines	  
and	  systems	  of	  monitoring	  and	  review	  in	  providing	  
any	  form	  of	  healthcare	  to	  patients,	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  or	  
otherwise.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  organisations	  that	  
offer	  information	  and	  advice	  to	  stakeholders,	  as	  well	  
as	  careful	  monitoring	  and	  oversight,	  to	  ensure	  high	  
standards	  of	  professional	  practice	  and	  regulated	  
professional	  accreditation.	  These	  organisations	  
include	  the	  Australian	  Health	  Practitioner	  
Regulation	  Agency	  (AHPRA),	  the	  Australian	  
Commission	  on	  Safety	  and	  Quality	  in	  Health	  Care,	  
the	  Australian	  Medical	  Association	  (AMA),	  Tasmania	  
Medicare	  Local	  and	  the	  GP	  Tasmania	  network,	  the	  
Tasmanian	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  
Services,	  Advocacy	  Tasmania,	  the	  Health	  Complaints	  
Commissioner	  and	  Ombudsman	  Tasmania.	  	  
The	  only	  aspect	  of	  this	  list	  that	  does	  not	  currently	  
exist	  is	  the	  legal	  option	  for	  doctors	  to	  provide	  
assistance	  to	  patients	  who	  seek	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  or	  physician	  assisted	  suicide.	  The	  final	  
claim	  about	  ‘improving	  respect	  for	  and	  acceptance	  of	  
the	  law’	  is	  vague	  and	  seems	  to	  suggest	  moderate	  
prevalence	  of	  disrespect	  for	  the	  law	  as	  it	  currently	  
stands	  and	  homogenous	  ‘community	  opinion’.	  This	  
statement	  does	  not	  adequately	  recognise	  and	  
appreciate	  the	  plurality,	  diversity	  and	  complexity	  of	  
social	  attitudes	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  
population	  in	  this	  area.	  
The	  paper	  and	  the	  authors’	  respective	  contributions	  
to	  the	  public	  record	  continually	  assert	  that	  the	  
weight	  of	  public	  opinion	  is	  behind	  them	  in	  legalising	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  They	  cite	  
opinion	  polls	  to	  support	  that	  their	  proposal	  has	  the	  
backing	  of	  the	  Tasmanian	  public	  and	  argue	  that	  ‘the	  
case	  for	  legalising	  reform	  has	  continued	  to	  
strengthen’	  (Giddings	  &	  McKim,	  2013:	  1)	  since	  2009.	  
Two	  overarching	  points	  need	  to	  be	  made	  in	  response	  
to	  their	  claims.	  Firstly,	  their	  claims	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  
public	  opinion	  need	  to	  be	  better	  substantiated,	  not	  
only	  through	  opinion	  polls	  but	  through	  more	  
thorough	  research.	  Their	  claims	  are	  contested.	  There	  
was	  doubt	  cast	  over	  the	  opinion	  polls	  conducted	  in	  
Tasmania	  during	  the	  last	  attempt	  at	  law	  reform,	  and	  
this	  doubt	  has	  not	  been	  suitably	  averted.	  McGee	  
(2011a),	  a	  legal	  scholar	  from	  the	  Queensland	  
University	  of	  Technology,	  criticised	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim’s	  claims	  at	  the	  time	  of	  public	  support	  for	  the	  
Dying	  with	  Dignity	  Bill	  because	  those	  claims	  were	  
based	  on	  a	  survey	  with	  methodological	  problems,	  
confusing	  terminology	  and	  oblique	  
conceptualisation.	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	  poll	  figure	  of	  
80%	  of	  Tasmanians	  saying	  they	  do	  support	  
euthanasia	  could	  be	  misleading	  because	  of	  unclear	  
specification	  of	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  this	  umbrella	  
term	  (McGee,	  2011b).	  Based	  on	  these	  criticisms,	  the	  
counter-­‐claim	  could	  be	  made	  that,	  if	  the	  Tasmanian	  
public	  is	  actually	  well	  informed	  on	  the	  issues,	  and	  
the	  details	  of	  the	  practices	  (and	  in	  what	  
circumstances)	  that	  they	  are	  being	  asked	  to	  support,	  
the	  research	  statistics	  and	  qualitative	  feedback	  from	  
the	  local	  public	  may	  become	  richer.	  	  
Secondly,	  opinion	  poll	  results	  bear	  limited	  relevance	  
to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  specific	  model	  (and	  
accompanying	  Bill)	  being	  proposed	  by	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim.	  A	  “yes”	  in	  principle	  does	  not	  equate	  with	  
informed	  consent	  and	  unmitigated	  support	  for	  the	  
details	  and	  practices	  they	  are	  putting	  forward.	  It	  is	  
anticipated	  there	  are	  people	  who	  may	  support	  the	  
case	  for	  law	  reform,	  but	  concede	  the	  issues	  with	  or	  
oppose	  the	  model	  that	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  have	  put	  
forward.	  	  
But	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  point	  to	  make	  about	  
opinion	  poll	  results	  is	  that	  consensus	  views	  can	  be	  
wrong.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  probable	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  
Tasmanians	  support	  paying	  less	  tax	  or	  significant	  
reductions	  to	  politicians’	  wages.	  Of	  themselves,	  such	  
majority	  opinions	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  policy	  
because	  they	  would	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  sole	  
justification.	  Pro-­‐euthanasia	  advocates	  might	  
distinguish	  our	  examples.	  They	  might	  argue	  that	  
popular	  opinion	  on	  euthanasia	  is	  different	  because	  it	  
is	  about	  individuals’	  rights	  over	  their	  own	  bodies	  –	  
in	  other	  words	  individuals’	  right	  to	  autonomy	  and	  
their	  right	  to	  die.	  However,	  where	  rights	  are	  
concerned	  the	  euthanasia	  debate	  is	  not	  just	  about	  
individuals’	  ‘right	  to	  die’;	  axiomatically	  it	  includes	  
generating	  an	  obligation	  or	  burden	  to	  cause	  or	  assist	  
death	  (Putnam,	  2009).	  This	  paper	  questions	  the	  
value	  of	  opinion	  polls	  on	  this	  latter	  issue	  –	  given	  the	  
complexity	  of	  such	  an	  enduring	  and	  extraordinary	  
obligation	  on	  the	  state.	  	  	  





LEGAL & SOCIOLOGICAL 
ISSUES  
	  
Understanding	  ‘The	  Case	  Against’	  –	  
The	  Diversity	  of	  Opponents	  	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013:	  2)	  use	  strong	  language	  
to	  describe	  those	  with	  differing	  perspectives	  to	  
theirs,	  describing	  opponents	  as	  ‘fearful’,	  ‘inaccurate’,	  
illogical	  and	  ‘unscholarly’.	  The	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘case	  
against’	  legalising	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide	  in	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  paper	  is	  very	  short.	  
In	  order	  to	  remedy	  this,	  and	  complement	  and	  add	  to	  
what	  White	  and	  Willmott	  (2012)	  have	  already	  said	  
in	  outlining	  ‘the	  case	  against’,	  it	  is	  worth	  briefly	  
noting	  the	  highly	  cited	  conclusions	  of	  Professor	  Yale	  
Kamisar	  (1958,	  1995,	  1996a,	  1996b,	  1998,	  2008,	  
2012).	  
• Associating	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide	  with	  ‘dignity’,	  compassion	  and	  human	  
rights	  wrongly	  implies	  that	  critics	  and	  
opponents	  are	  somehow	  against	  these	  things,	  
which	  is	  an	  inaccurate	  and	  misleading	  
construction	  of	  ‘the	  case	  against.’	  Critics	  and	  
opponents	  are	  diverse,	  and	  often	  hold	  firm	  
beliefs	  around	  promoting	  ‘a	  good	  death’;	  
• Many	  who	  support	  ‘the	  case	  against’	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  defend	  the	  
important	  distinction	  between	  killing	  versus	  
letting	  die	  (refusing	  or	  stopping	  treatment);	  
• Calls	  for	  legalisation	  are	  often	  founded	  on	  the	  
unsubstantiated	  claim	  that	  ‘physicians	  are	  doing	  
it	  anyway’	  and	  that	  this	  is	  secretly	  common.	  
Counterarguments	  point	  out	  the	  illogical	  nature	  
of	  introducing	  new	  laws	  with	  ‘safeguards’	  to	  a	  
field	  of	  practitioners	  who	  are	  by	  the	  same	  
argument	  breaking	  current	  criminal	  laws,	  the	  
extent	  of	  which	  is	  under-­‐researched.	  
Additionally,	  criminal	  convictions	  (as	  a	  final	  
result	  of	  monitoring	  and	  sanctioning)	  of	  doctors	  
who	  break	  the	  law	  are	  rare.	  So	  how	  and	  why	  
would	  this	  dramatically	  change	  with	  legalisation	  
of	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide?	   
• Voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide,	  in	  
practice,	  tends	  to	  extend	  beyond	  people	  who	  are	  
‘terminal’	  to	  encompass	  other	  forms	  of	  suffering.	  
Kamisar	  (1997:	  128)	  argues	  that	  others	  can	  and	  
will	  gain	  access	  to	  assisted	  suicide,	  ‘To	  argue	  
that	  suicide	  is	  plausible	  or	  understandable	  in	  
order	  to	  escape	  intense	  physical	  pain	  or	  to	  end	  
a	  physically	  debilitated	  life	  but	  for	  no	  other	  
reason	  is	  to	  show	  oneself	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  the	  
depth	  and	  complexity	  of	  human	  motives.’	  
• Media	  reporting	  and	  public	  debate	  about	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  can	  become	  too	  focused	  
around	  actual	  and	  hypothetical	  individualised	  
cases,	  usually	  sad	  and	  tragic	  stories,	  to	  the	  
detriment	  of	  properly	  understanding	  the	  societal	  
consequences	  of	  legalising	  the	  practice.	  The	  
‘heart	  wrenching	  compelling	  case’	  affects	  how	  
people	  respond	  to	  opinion	  polls,	  but	  is	  in	  danger	  
of	  ignoring	  the	  wider	  social	  context	  and	  costs.	  
Public	  policy	  cannot	  be	  made	  for	  one	  –	  it	  is	  made	  
for	  all,	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  eligibility	  criteria.	  
More	  of	  the	  issues	  encompassed	  within	  ‘the	  case	  
against’	  are	  covered	  in	  the	  ‘International	  Evidence	  
and	  History	  Re-­‐Visited’	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
	  
‘Legalising	  ‘assisted	  dying’	  places	  a	  huge	  burden	  
on	  the	  vulnerable…	  We	  should	  not	  worsen	  the	  
situation	  for	  the	  vulnerable	  by	  making	  it	  easy	  to	  
point	  them	  to	  the	  door.	  Laws	  are	  written	  for	  all	  
of	  us	  in	  all	  situations	  –	  not	  just	  for	  the	  unusually	  
independent.	  Legalising	  ‘assisted	  dying’	  
amounts	  to	  adopting	  a	  principle	  of	  indifference	  
towards	  a	  special	  and	  acute	  form	  of	  
vulnerability:	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  a	  few	  
independent	  folk	  to	  get	  others	  to	  kill	  them	  on	  
demand,	  we	  are	  to	  be	  indifferent	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
many	  less	  independent	  people	  would	  come	  
under	  pressure	  to	  request	  the	  same.’	  




The	  Potential	  for	  Elder	  Abuse	  	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013:	  2)	  assert	  that	  they	  ‘have	  
not	  been	  able	  to	  find	  any	  sound	  evidence	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  heightened	  risk	  for	  people	  who	  may	  be	  
vulnerable	  due	  to	  their	  age,	  disability,	  mental	  illness	  
or	  isolation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  assisted	  dying	  legislation.’	  
Others	  have	  been	  more	  cautious.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  Swiss	  context,	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  stated	  that	  “the	  risk	  of	  abuse	  inherent	  
in	  a	  system	  which	  facilitated	  assisted	  suicide”	  should	  
not	  be	  “underestimated”	  (Registrar	  of	  the	  European	  
Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  2011:	  3).	  Similarly,	  White	  
and	  Willmott	  (2012),	  prominent	  academics	  and	  
activists	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  
and	  assisted	  suicide	  laws	  in	  Australia,	  acknowledge	  
the	  limitations	  of	  safeguards	  and	  the	  potential	  risks	  
for	  vulnerable	  people:	  	  
It	  would	  be	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  ensure	  all	  
of	  the	  legislative	  requirements	  relating	  to	  eligibility	  
are	  satisfied	  in	  all	  cases.	  Of	  particular	  concern	  may	  
be	  the	  ability	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  request	  to	  die	  was	  
given	  voluntarily.	  A	  person	  approaching	  the	  end	  of	  
his	  or	  her	  life	  who	  relies	  heavily	  on	  others	  for	  all	  
aspects	  of	  living	  may	  be	  pressured	  to	  end	  his	  or	  her	  
life.	  Such	  pressure	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  overt,	  and	  
may	  be	  exerted	  in	  subtle	  ways.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  
may	  result	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  request	  to	  die	  cannot	  
be	  regarded	  as	  having	  been	  made	  voluntarily.	  This	  
inability	  to	  ensure	  that	  safeguards	  are	  observed	  
means	  there	  is	  potential	  for	  abuse	  in	  that	  a	  person	  
who	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  legislation	  
may	  be	  killed.	  Vulnerable	  individuals	  in	  our	  society,	  
such	  as	  the	  sick,	  the	  elderly	  and	  those	  living	  with	  
disabilities,	  will	  be	  at	  risk.	  (White	  &	  Willmott,	  2012:	  
18)	  
Prichard	  (2012)	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  but	  
after	  reviewing	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  elder	  abuse.	  Among	  other	  sources,	  
Prichard	  (2012:	  617)	  pointed	  to	  qualitative	  case	  
studies	  of	  elder	  abuse	  to	  highlight	  the	  strength	  and	  
subtlety	  of	  psychological	  control	  that	  elderly	  people	  
may	  experience:	  
He	  knows	  he	  can	  do	  with	  me	  what	  he	  likes,	  because	  
there	  is	  no	  one	  here	  to	  help	  me,	  and	  I	  can’t	  cope	  
with	  it	  very	  well.	  We	  sit	  in	  the	  dining	  room	  chair	  to	  
chair,	  and	  he	  never	  spoke	  to	  me	  for	  7	  weeks.	  He	  said	  
I	  hadn’t	  been	  a	  mother,	  I’d	  been	  an	  enemy.	  I	  don’t	  
know	  how	  he	  got	  like	  this.	  
Now	  I	  am	  like	  this,	  I	  am	  nothing,	  worth	  nothing	  
anymore.	  I	  can’t	  do	  much,	  my	  house	  looks	  terrible	  ...	  
it’s	  very,	  very	  difficult.	  He	  makes	  me	  responsible	  for	  
everything	  that	  is	  happening	  to	  him	  now,	  that	  it’s	  all	  
my	  fault,	  but	  I	  can’t,	  I	  can’t	  cope	  with	  it,	  but	  I	  haven’t	  
done	  anything	  to	  him.	  I	  just	  helped	  and	  helped	  and	  
helped,	  and	  paid	  and	  paid	  and	  paid.	  
Using	  the	  elder	  abuse	  literature,	  Prichard	  also	  
argued	  that	  psychological	  pressure	  –	  unintended	  or	  
intended	  –	  in	  the	  euthanasia	  context	  would	  be	  very	  
difficult	  to	  measure	  with	  purely	  quantitative	  studies.	  
Citing	  Materstvedt	  (2009),	  Prichard	  described	  the	  
need	  for	  carefully	  designed	  qualitative	  studies	  of	  
pressure	  in	  systems	  of	  legalised	  euthanasia.	  As	  
Prichard	  noted,	  only	  one	  such	  qualitative	  study	  has	  
been	  published.	  Interestingly,	  that	  study	  did	  record	  
one	  case	  where	  apparently	  a	  patient	  had	  been	  
pressured	  into	  requesting	  access	  to	  euthanasia	  
(Norwood,	  Kimsma,	  &	  Battin,	  2009).	  	  
Prichard	  (2012:	  620)	  concluded	  that	  the	  study	  of	  
pressure	  in	  the	  context	  of	  euthanasia	  is	  “in	  its	  
infancy”.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  seems	  much	  more	  likely	  
that	  the	  absence	  of	  what	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  call	  
‘sound	  evidence’	  on	  vulnerability	  reflects	  the	  paucity	  
of	  research	  on	  the	  topic,	  rather	  than	  an	  indication	  
that	  legalised	  euthanasia	  systems	  are	  risk-­‐free	  for	  
marginalised	  groups.	  
The	  issue	  of	  pressure	  is	  complex.	  It	  is	  feasible	  that	  
pressure	  could	  be	  experienced	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  
including	  a	  patient’s	  sense	  that	  applying	  for	  access	  to	  
an	  euthanasia	  system	  is	  the	  ‘right	  thing	  to	  do’.	  On	  
this	  note	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  data	  from	  the	  
physician-­‐assisted	  system	  in	  Oregon.	  Oregon	  Public	  
Health’s	  annual	  reports	  contain	  statistics	  on	  
numbers	  of	  patients	  who	  noted	  that	  part	  of	  their	  
motivation	  to	  request	  euthanasia	  was	  because	  they	  
felt	  ‘a	  burden	  on	  family	  and	  friends’.	  These	  statistics	  
are	  illustrated	  in	  Table	  2.	  It	  should	  be	  highlighted	  
that	  these	  only	  represent	  occasions	  where	  patients	  
expressed	  their	  concern	  to	  physicians	  without	  
prompting;	  the	  physicians	  then	  recorded	  and	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Table	  2:	  	  ‘Burden	  to	  Family	  and	  Friends’	  as	  an	  End	  of	  
Life	  Concern	  Reported	  by	  Death	  with	  Dignity	  Act	  
Patients	  to	  Oregon	  Physicians	  –	  Trends	  Over	  Time	  
Year	   Percentage	  (%)	  citing	  this	  concern	  
1998	   12%	  
1999	   26%	  
2000	   63%	  
2001	   24%	  
2002	   37%	  
2003	   38%	  
2004	   38%	  
2005	   42%	  
2006	   43%	  
2007	   44%	  
2008	   33%	  
2009	   25%	  
2010	   26%	  
2011	   42%	  
2012	   57%	  
Sources:	  Oregon	  Public	  Health	  (2001;	  2002;	  2003;	  2004;	  
2005;	  2006;	  2007;	  2008;	  2009;	  2010;	  2011;	  2012;	  2013).	  	  
Importantly,	  in	  most	  years	  between	  1998	  to	  2012	  
more	  than	  one	  in	  three	  patients	  in	  the	  euthanasia	  
system	  apparently	  perceived	  themselves	  as	  a	  
‘burden’	  to	  family	  and	  friends.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  only	  a	  
fraction	  of	  these	  patients	  requested	  euthanasia	  
primarily	  because	  they	  perceived	  themselves	  as	  a	  
burden	  to	  others.	  But	  even	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  what	  do	  
these	  data	  suggest	  about	  the	  social	  support	  and	  care	  
afforded	  the	  elderly	  in	  the	  Oregon	  system?	  Issues	  
such	  as	  these	  were	  not	  touched	  upon	  by	  Giddings	  
and	  McKim	  (2013).	  
One	  of	  the	  recurrent	  issues	  in	  this	  area	  is	  the	  poor	  
conceptualisation	  and	  lack	  of	  definition	  and	  
consensus	  of	  ‘vulnerability’	  and,	  also,	  ‘unbearable	  
suffering.’	  The	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  paper	  
does	  not	  define	  ‘vulnerability’,	  in	  fact,	  that	  exact	  
word	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  their	  paper	  at	  all.	  People	  
are	  described	  as	  ‘vulnerable’	  here	  and	  there,	  without	  
due	  conceptualisation	  and	  theorising	  of	  what	  is	  
meant	  by	  that.	  Yet	  bioethicists,	  social	  scientists	  and	  
criminologists	  alike	  underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  
defining	  vulnerability	  and	  supporting	  it	  in	  all	  its	  
forms	  (Dodds,	  2007;	  Rogers	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Bartkowiak-­‐
Théron	  &	  Asquith,	  2012;	  Graham,	  2011,	  2012).	  It	  is	  
going	  to	  be	  extremely	  hard	  to	  safeguard	  what	  is	  not	  
properly	  understood,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  
recognising	  and	  supporting	  marginalised,	  ‘hidden	  
populations’	  and	  at-­‐risk	  individuals.	  	  
	  
Many	  Disability	  Advocates	  Oppose	  
Euthanasia	  and	  Assisted	  Suicide	  	  
The	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  paper	  and	  model	  
draws	  clear	  links	  between	  a	  person’s	  quality	  of	  life	  
and	  notions	  of	  dignity	  and	  autonomy.	  In	  essence,	  the	  
argument	  goes	  that,	  in	  the	  event	  of	  ‘poor	  quality	  of	  
life’	  and	  unbearable	  or	  intolerable	  suffering,	  people	  
who	  are	  eligible	  should	  be	  able	  to	  choose	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  This	  argument	  is	  
not	  unique	  to	  the	  Tasmanian	  paper	  and	  model,	  and	  
has	  been	  debated	  and	  critiqued	  more	  widely	  in	  the	  
international	  literature,	  briefly	  summarised	  here.	  
Associating	  worth	  with	  dignity	  and	  autonomy	  can	  
have	  dangerous	  ethical	  ramifications.	  	  
The	  most	  powerful	  criticisms	  of	  this	  argument	  are	  
raised	  by	  disability	  rights	  advocates	  and	  people	  with	  
‘The	  opposition	  being	  mounted	  by	  disability	  
advocates	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  
disability	  experience.	  Advocates	  who	  have	  
worked	  with	  newly	  disabled	  individuals,	  or	  who	  
may	  remember	  their	  own	  experiences	  are	  
deeply	  concerned	  about	  the	  impact	  legalisation	  
would	  have	  on	  people	  who	  may	  be	  struggling	  
with	  difficult	  personal	  adjustments	  and,	  not	  
infrequently,	  with	  rejection	  and	  loss	  of	  hope.	  
The	  annals	  of	  the	  disability	  rights	  movement	  are	  
punctuated	  with	  stories	  of	  individuals	  who	  “just	  
wanted	  to	  die”	  before	  coming	  to	  realise	  they	  
could	  still	  lead	  good,	  contributing	  lives.	  
Advocates	  worry	  that	  some	  people	  would	  never	  
get	  to	  that	  realisation	  if	  assisted	  suicide	  becomes	  
legal.	  People	  who	  have	  personal	  histories	  of	  
trauma…	  would	  be	  particularly	  vulnerable.’	  
James	  McGaughey	  (2013),	  Executive	  Director,	  Office	  





disabilities	  (Newell,	  1996;	  Haller	  &	  Ralph,	  2001;	  
Davis,	  2004).	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  numerous	  
disability	  organisations	  have	  opposed	  state	  attempts	  
to	  legalise	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  These	  
organisations	  include	  the	  National	  Council	  on	  
Disability,	  the	  American	  Association	  of	  People	  with	  
Disabilities,	  the	  National	  Spinal	  Cord	  Injury	  
Association,	  the	  Disability	  Rights	  Education	  and	  
Defense	  Fund,	  the	  World	  Institute	  on	  Disability,	  and	  
Not	  Dead	  Yet	  (McGaughey,	  2013).	  
Golden	  and	  Zoanni	  (2010)	  strongly	  argue	  against	  it	  
on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds,	  but	  first	  and	  foremost	  
because	  it	  has	  adverse	  implications	  for	  people	  with	  
disabilities,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  eligible	  for	  or	  
considering	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  or	  assisted	  suicide.	  
The	  implication	  that	  some	  people	  are	  ‘better	  off	  
dead’	  and	  that	  ‘some	  lives	  are	  not	  worth	  living’,	  
phrases	  which	  have	  been	  used	  in	  discussions	  in	  
places	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  jurisdictions	  
around	  the	  world	  debating	  euthanasia,	  are	  
potentially	  offensive	  and	  stigmatising	  to	  those	  who	  
live	  with	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  symptoms	  and	  
conditions.	  British	  paralympian	  and	  Baroness	  Tanni	  
Grey-­‐Thompson	  (MBE)	  explains	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  
that	  concern	  her	  and	  other	  people	  with	  disabilities:	  
‘Legalising	  assisted	  dying	  for	  terminally	  ill	  people	  
reinforces	  prejudices	  for	  people	  with	  disabilities.	  
Terminal	  illness	  and	  physical	  disability	  aren’t,	  of	  
course,	  the	  same	  thing	  –	  many	  people	  with	  
disabilities	  aren’t	  terminally	  ill.	  But	  terminal	  illness	  
can	  often	  bring	  with	  it	  disability	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  
another	  and	  it’s	  not	  a	  big	  step	  in	  popular	  
perceptions	  to	  see	  the	  two	  in	  some	  way	  linked.	  
That’s	  why	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  with	  disabilities,	  
including	  me,	  are	  afraid	  of	  a	  law	  that	  would	  offer	  a	  
lesser	  standard	  of	  protection	  to	  seriously	  ill	  people	  
than	  to	  others’	  (Grey-­‐Thompson,	  2013)	  
In	  addition	  to	  this,	  Coleman	  (2000,	  2010)	  and	  the	  
Not	  Dead	  Yet	  national	  disability	  rights	  organisation	  
in	  the	  United	  States	  argue	  that	  assisted	  suicide	  laws	  
create	  a	  discriminatory	  double	  standard	  for	  who	  is	  
the	  focus	  of	  suicide	  prevention	  and	  who	  has	  access	  to	  
suicide	  assistance.	  	  
	  
	  
Feminist	  Perspectives:	  The	  
Gendered	  Risks	  of	  Voluntary	  
Euthanasia	  and	  Assisted	  Suicide	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  concern	  in	  this	  section	  particularly	  
relates	  to	  the	  experiences	  of	  women,	  while	  also	  
recognising	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  importance	  of	  
understanding	  the	  experiences	  and	  perspectives	  of	  
men.	  There	  is	  an	  emerging	  literature	  that	  raises	  
concerns	  about	  the	  wellbeing	  and	  rights	  of	  women	  
and	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  sex	  and	  
gender	  on	  decisions	  regarding	  and	  circumstances	  
surrounding	  the	  end	  of	  life	  and	  hastening	  death	  (see	  
Osgood	  &	  Eisenhandler,	  1994;	  Callahan,	  1996;	  Wolf,	  
1996;	  Raymond,	  1999;	  Canetto	  &	  Hollenshead,	  2000,	  
2001,	  2002;	  Parks,	  2000;	  Platt,	  2000;	  Allen,	  2002;	  
George,	  2007),	  as	  well	  as	  broader	  coverage	  of	  issues	  
of	  ageing,	  autonomy,	  gender	  oppression	  and	  
injustice	  in	  healthcare	  provision	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life	  
(Dodds,	  2005).	  
The	  prevalence	  of	  gendered	  violence	  (especially	  
intimate	  partner	  violence)	  and,	  in	  this	  the	  
disproportionate	  victimisation	  of	  women,	  in	  
Australia	  is	  concerning	  –	  one	  in	  three	  Australian	  
women	  have	  experienced	  physical	  violence	  since	  the	  
age	  of	  15	  (COAG,	  2012:	  2).	  It	  is	  vitally	  necessary	  to	  
carefully	  consider	  the	  potential	  for	  gendered	  
violence	  and	  familial	  control	  to	  be	  directly	  or	  subtly	  
influential,	  if	  not	  implicated,	  in	  matters	  of	  the	  
‘voluntary’	  assisted	  death	  of	  women.	  Where	  there	  
has	  been	  coercion,	  control	  and	  gendered	  violence	  in	  
a	  woman’s	  life,	  the	  nature	  of	  which	  may	  often	  be	  
kept	  hidden	  and	  secret	  from	  others	  (including	  in	  
professional	  and	  personal	  relationships)	  in	  her	  life,	  it	  
is	  important	  to	  ask	  whether	  this	  might	  be	  a	  factor	  in	  
a	  woman’s	  death.	  	  
George	  (2007)	  uses	  a	  feminist	  lens	  to	  critically	  
analyse	  a	  1996	  national	  survey	  of	  euthanasia	  and	  
physician-­‐assisted	  suicide	  on	  the	  United	  States	  by	  
Meier	  et	  al.	  (1998).	  Her	  observations	  on	  the	  
gendered	  risks	  to	  women	  are	  relevant:	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  1996	  US	  study	  are	  a	  challenge	  to	  
the	  autonomy	  of	  decisions	  for	  assisted	  death	  and	  
decisions	  for	  euthanasia	  in	  particular….	  For	  the	  
women	  in	  this	  US	  study,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  choice	  rings	  
a	  little	  hollow.	  Compared	  to	  men,	  women	  died	  in	  
circumstances	  where	  their	  requests	  are	  less	  likely	  
to	  be	  explicit,	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  at	  their	  personal	  
request	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  initiated	  by	  family	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members	  or	  partners.	  The	  euthanasia	  cases	  were	  
also	  characterised	  by	  weaker	  doctor-­‐patient	  
relationships:	  in	  12%	  of	  cases,	  the	  physician	  had	  
known	  the	  patient	  for	  less	  than	  four	  weeks	  (Meier	  
et	  al.,	  1998).	  Thus,	  the	  women	  considering	  whether	  
to	  end	  their	  lives	  were	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  
benefit	  of	  an	  established	  relationship	  with	  their	  
physician	  (George,	  2007:	  6).	  
On	  a	  separate	  but	  related	  note	  (making	  the	  
important	  distinction	  between	  ‘mercy	  killing’	  as	  
different	  from	  voluntary	  euthanasia),	  she	  identifies	  
what	  she	  calls	  ‘striking	  correlations	  between	  
patterns	  of	  male	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  the	  
mercy	  killing	  of	  women’	  (George,	  2007:	  11-­‐14).	  In	  
her	  overall	  analysis	  of	  the	  realities	  of	  women’s	  
autonomy	  and	  opportunities	  for	  meaningful	  choice	  
in	  matters	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia,	  physician	  
assisted	  or	  otherwise,	  George	  (2007:	  8-­‐9)	  concludes	  
that	  ‘for	  some	  women,	  the	  decision	  for	  death	  may	  be	  
a	  ‘non-­‐choice’,	  induced	  by	  controlling	  influences	  that	  
subvert	  women’s	  autonomy	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life.’	  	  She	  
calls	  for	  closer	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  gendered	  risks	  to	  
women	  of	  physician	  assisted	  suicide	  and	  euthanasia,	  
saying	  that	  when	  women	  do	  decide	  to	  carry	  through	  
with	  these	  things	  ‘we	  need	  to	  ask	  why	  they	  make	  
that	  decision’	  (pg	  18,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original),	  
warning	  that	  some	  women	  will	  encounter	  unique	  
risks,	  control,	  domination	  and	  pressures	  that	  are	  not	  
currently	  well	  researched	  or	  understood	  in	  these	  
specific	  matters	  of	  life	  and	  death.	  
The	  words	  ‘gender’	  and	  ‘women’	  are	  not	  mentioned	  
at	  all	  in	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  108	  page	  
paper.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  feminist	  scholarly	  literature	  
briefly	  raised	  here,	  these	  are	  important	  issues	  that	  
warrant	  more	  sophisticated	  consideration	  in	  the	  
Tasmanian	  context	  than	  has	  occurred	  to	  date.	  
Feminists	  are	  likely	  to	  take	  diverse	  standpoints	  on	  
the	  issue,	  some	  in	  support	  and	  some	  against,	  yet	  
feminist	  scholarship	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  at	  least	  
considering	  the	  experiences	  and	  perspectives	  of	  
women	  at	  the	  end	  of	  life.	  Gender	  responsive	  
healthcare	  and	  service	  provision	  matters.	  If	  there	  is	  
the	  potential	  for	  gendered	  risks	  in	  legalising	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide,	  then	  this	  
necessitates	  public	  acknowledgment	  and	  further	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‘Slippery	  Slope’	  Arguments	  and	  
Risks	  of	  ‘Bracket	  Creep’:	  Evidence	  
from	  Other	  Countries	  	  
There	  are	  cogent	  arguments	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  
so-­‐called	  ‘slippery	  slope’,	  including	  the	  potential	  to	  
shift	  from	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  
to	  the	  normalisation	  and	  routine	  practice	  of	  non-­‐
voluntary	  euthanasia.	  There	  are	  also	  risks	  of	  ‘net	  
widening’,	  ‘bracket	  creep’	  and	  shifts	  from	  strict	  
eligibility	  criteria	  to	  broad	  eligibility	  criteria,	  
resulting	  in	  mixed	  messages	  and	  potentially	  serious	  
risks	  for	  vulnerable	  people	  (Foley,	  1997;	  
Amarasekara	  &	  Bagaric,	  2004;	  Golden	  &	  Zoanni,	  
2010;	  Jones,	  2011;	  Jackson	  &	  Keown,	  2012;	  Finlay	  &	  
George,	  2011;	  Pereira,	  2011;	  Prichard,	  2012;	  
Schadenberg,	  2012;	  Titterington	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  cf	  
Kerridge	  &	  Mitchell,	  1996;	  Shariff,	  2012;	  Lewis,	  
2007a,	  2007b).	  Similar	  philosophical,	  social	  and	  
medical	  perspectives	  and	  concerns	  have	  been	  
expressed	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  context	  in	  public	  
opinion	  and	  submissions	  to	  the	  recent	  and	  current	  
bids	  for	  euthanasia	  law	  reform	  (see,	  for	  example,	  
Giselsson,	  2009,	  2013;	  Malpas	  &	  Lickess,	  2009;	  
Smith,	  2013).	  	  
The	  debate	  about	  ‘safeguards’,	  slippery	  slopes	  and	  
evidence	  of	  impact	  on	  vulnerability	  has	  been	  played	  
out	  in	  public	  debate	  and	  academic	  analysis	  in	  North	  
America	  and	  Europe	  (see	  Avila,	  2000;	  	  Battin	  et	  al.,	  
2007;	  cf	  Finlay	  &	  George	  2011).	  	  
Concerns	  and	  questions	  have	  also	  been	  raised	  closer	  
to	  home.	  In	  their	  consideration	  of	  Australian	  and	  
Italian	  end	  of	  life	  law,	  Australian	  academics	  Faunce	  
and	  Townsend	  (2012:	  173)	  speak	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  
changes	  in	  policy	  and	  practice	  arising	  because	  of	  
political	  and	  economic	  pressures	  on	  the	  state:	  
‘regardless	  of	  the	  …	  importance	  of	  respecting	  
individual	  patient	  rights	  in	  end-­‐of-­‐life	  decision-­‐
making,	  the	  financial	  constraints	  upon	  governments	  
to	  care	  for	  an	  ageing	  population	  will	  increasingly	  
provide	  consequentialist	  interest…	  in	  permitting	  
physician	  assisted	  suicide	  when	  requested	  by	  
competent,	  non-­‐depressed	  patients	  with	  a	  terminal	  
illness	  who	  have	  already	  received	  reasonable	  
palliative	  care.’	  This	  contextualises	  discussions	  of	  
individual	  patient	  rights	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  
broader	  economic	  and	  political	  imperatives.	  	  	  
At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  Dr	  Philip	  Nitschke,	  
the	  leading	  proponent	  of	  euthanasia	  and	  one	  of	  the	  
few	  doctors	  to	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  its	  state-­‐
endorsed	  practice	  in	  Australia,	  openly	  states	  that	  the	  
campaign	  to	  extend	  the	  remit	  of	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  is	  already	  well	  
underway.	  He	  says	  ‘in	  the	  intervening	  16	  years	  since	  
the	  Northern	  Territory	  Rights	  of	  the	  Terminally	  Ill	  
Act	  came	  and	  went,	  the	  debate	  on	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  has	  been	  extended	  beyond	  those	  who	  are	  
terminally	  ill,	  to	  include	  the	  well	  elderly	  for	  whom	  
rational	  suicide	  is	  one	  of	  the	  many	  end	  of	  life	  
options’	  (Nitschke	  cited	  in	  Douglas,	  Willmott	  &	  
White,	  2013:	  25).	  This	  type	  of	  public	  lobbying	  is	  an	  
example	  of	  what	  may	  occur	  to	  an	  even	  greater	  extent	  
if	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  are	  
legalised.	  What	  Philip	  Nitschke	  proposes	  is	  an	  
example	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  ‘bracket	  creep.’	  	  	  
	  
Belgium:	  Evidence	  that	  ‘Safeguards’	  
are	  Fallible	  and	  May	  Be	  Ignored	  
In	  Belgium,	  euthanasia	  was	  legalised	  in	  2002.	  Closer	  
examination	  of	  both	  official	  statistics	  (i.e.	  reported	  
cases	  and	  documented	  practices)	  and	  research	  into	  
unreported	  cases	  and	  actual	  practices	  in	  Belgium	  
highlight	  that	  concerns	  about	  unprofessional	  
practice	  at	  an	  individual	  level	  and	  ‘bracket	  creep’	  at	  
a	  societal	  level	  are	  well	  founded.	  Research	  and	  
analysis	  by	  Bilsen	  and	  colleagues	  (2009),	  Chambaere	  
and	  colleagues	  (2010),	  Inghelbrecht	  and	  colleagues	  
(2009,	  2010)	  and	  Smets	  and	  colleagues	  (2010)	  show	  
that:	  
• Non-­‐voluntary	  euthanasia	  can	  and	  does	  
happen:	  There	  is	  consistent	  evidence	  from	  
Belgium	  showing	  that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  
patients	  were	  euthanased	  without	  their	  explicit	  
request	  or	  competent,	  informed	  consent.	  The	  
study	  by	  Chambaere	  and	  colleagues	  (2010)	  
shows	  that,	  in	  the	  Flanders	  region	  of	  Belgium,	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32%	  (n	  =	  66)	  of	  assisted	  deaths	  were	  done	  
without	  the	  explicit	  request	  or	  consent	  of	  the	  
patient.	  Of	  the	  66	  deceased	  non-­‐voluntary	  
euthanasia	  patients,	  approximately	  46	  of	  these	  
were	  comatose	  at	  the	  time	  of	  assisted	  death,	  and	  
14	  had	  dementia.	  An	  earlier	  article	  by	  Bilsen	  and	  
colleagues	  (2009:	  1120)	  identified	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  deceased	  non-­‐voluntary	  
euthanasia	  patients	  in	  the	  Flanders	  region	  of	  
Belgium	  as	  ‘mostly	  older,	  incompetent	  patients;	  
patients	  with	  cardiovascular	  diseases	  or	  cancer;	  
or	  patients	  dying	  in	  hospitals.’	  
• Vulnerable	  patients	  were	  euthanased	  
without	  their	  explicit	  request:	  Following	  on	  
from	  the	  first	  point,	  ‘most	  of	  the	  euthanasia	  
deaths	  without	  explicit	  request	  were	  done	  to	  
people	  who	  did	  not	  and	  could	  not	  request	  
euthanasia	  at	  the	  time	  of	  death…	  The	  
demographic	  group	  of	  patients	  euthanized	  
without	  explicit	  request	  “fits	  the	  description	  of	  
“vulnerable”	  patient	  groups	  at	  risk	  of	  life-­‐ending	  
without	  request”’	  (Schadenberg,	  2012:	  14).	  This	  
is	  especially	  concerning	  given	  that	  Belgian	  
people	  who	  died	  by	  euthanasia	  without	  explicit	  
request	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  a	  cure	  as	  
their	  goal	  of	  treatment	  in	  the	  last	  week	  prior	  to	  
their	  death.	  
• Nurses	  have	  illegally	  administered	  
euthanasia	  drugs	  to	  patients	  without	  their	  
explicit	  request,	  mostly	  without	  a	  doctor	  
present:	  (Chambaere	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  897;	  
Inghelbrecht	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Smets	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  
Belgium,	  the	  euthanasia	  law	  only	  allows	  
physicians	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  (Inghelbrecht	  et	  
al.,	  2010).	  However,	  worryingly,	  the	  
Inghelbrecht	  (2010:	  905)	  study	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
nurses	  showed	  that	  ‘The	  life-­‐ending	  drugs	  were	  
administered	  by	  the	  nurse	  in	  12%	  of	  the	  cases	  of	  
euthanasia,	  as	  compared	  with	  45%	  of	  the	  cases	  
of	  assisted	  death	  without	  an	  explicit	  request.	  In	  
both	  types	  of	  assisted	  death,	  the	  nurses	  acted	  on	  
the	  physician’s	  orders	  but	  mostly	  in	  the	  
physician’s	  absence.’	  Inghelbrecht	  and	  
colleagues	  (2010:	  909)	  concluded	  that	  ‘the	  
current	  law	  (which	  does	  not	  allow	  nurses	  to	  
administer	  life-­‐ending	  drugs)	  and	  a	  control	  
system	  do	  not	  prevent	  nurses	  from	  
administering	  life-­‐ending	  drugs.’	  In	  another	  
study,	  Inghelbrecht	  and	  colleagues	  (2009)	  found	  
that	  Belgian	  paediatric	  intensive	  care	  nurses	  
administered	  life-­‐ending	  drugs	  to	  children	  to	  
hasten	  death,	  with	  or	  without	  a	  doctor	  present.	  
This	  is	  illegal	  but	  Belgian	  law	  reform	  to	  allow	  
child	  euthanasia	  is	  currently	  being	  discussed.	  
• Family	  members’	  wishes	  may	  influence	  the	  
practice	  of	  euthanasia	  without	  explicit	  
request:	  Euthanasia	  ‘without	  explicit	  request	  
was	  most	  often	  to	  reduce	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  
family	  or	  because	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  
needlessly	  prolong	  the	  life	  of	  the	  patient’	  
(Schadenberg,	  2012:	  14).	  Chambaere	  and	  
colleagues	  (2010:	  900)	  raise	  this	  as	  a	  concern	  
due	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  ‘conflict	  of	  interest’	  and	  
the	  violation	  of	  patients’	  rights.	  
• Under-­‐reporting	  appears	  widespread:	  
Research	  by	  Smets	  and	  colleagues	  (2010:	  5174)	  
in	  the	  Flanders	  region	  of	  Belgium	  shows	  that	  
‘only	  one	  out	  of	  two	  euthanasia	  cases	  is	  reported	  
to	  the	  Federal	  Control	  and	  Evaluation	  
Committee.	  Most	  non-­‐reporting	  physicians	  do	  
not	  perceive	  their	  act	  as	  euthanasia.	  Countries	  
debating	  legalisation	  of	  euthanasia	  should	  
simultaneously	  consider	  developing	  a	  policy	  
facilitating	  the	  due	  care	  and	  reporting	  
obligations	  of	  physicians.’	  
• More	  generally,	  significant	  increases	  in	  use	  of	  
deep	  continuous	  sedation	  in	  treatment	  of	  
dying	  patients	  have	  been	  observed:	  In	  the	  
Flanders	  region	  of	  Belgium	  between	  2001	  and	  
2007,	  the	  practice	  of	  deep	  continuous	  sedation	  
(sometimes	  called	  ‘terminal	  sedation’)	  increased	  
from	  estimates	  of	  8.2%	  of	  all	  deaths	  to	  14.5%	  of	  
all	  deaths	  (Bilsen	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  On	  a	  related	  note,	  
this	  trend	  was	  also	  observed	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  
where	  rates	  went	  from	  an	  estimated	  5.6%	  of	  all	  
deaths	  in	  2001	  (prior	  to	  euthanasia	  being	  
legalised	  in	  2002),	  to	  12.3%	  of	  all	  deaths	  in	  2010	  
(Onwuteaka-­‐Philipsen	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
In	  late	  July	  2013,	  Belgian	  oncologist	  Dr	  Benoit	  
Beuselinck	  publicly	  voiced	  his	  professional	  and	  
personal	  concerns	  in	  the	  Australian	  media,	  saying	  
‘For	  me	  and	  several	  of	  my	  colleagues,	  the	  euthanasia	  
law	  has	  been	  bad	  for	  Belgium:	  the	  patients	  are	  
finding	  less	  humanity,	  the	  doctors	  have	  more	  
difficulties	  in	  their	  daily	  work	  and	  finally,	  I	  think	  the	  
image	  of	  our	  country	  is	  suffering…	  In	  my	  practice	  it	  
occurred	  that	  some	  family	  members	  thought	  we	  
were	  euthanasing	  a	  patient	  without	  her	  demand.	  




he	  thought	  that	  palliative	  care	  would	  automatically	  
mean	  euthanasia.	  A	  colleague	  even	  received	  a	  false	  
demand	  for	  euthanasia,	  written	  by	  a	  son	  on	  behalf	  of	  
his	  father’	  (Doherty,	  2013).	  	  
An	  emerging	  issue	  for	  bioethicists	  and	  practitioners	  
in	  Belgium	  and	  elsewhere	  is	  that	  of	  organ	  donation	  
and	  ‘procurement’	  from	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide	  patients.	  There	  already	  have	  been	  
cases	  where	  the	  patients’	  euthanasia	  became	  a	  
surgical	  procedure,	  prior	  to	  and/or	  shortly	  after,	  
involving	  a	  wider	  team	  in	  procuring	  the	  organs	  
(Ysebaert	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  we	  wish	  to	  
flag	  here,	  however,	  it	  is	  too	  complex	  to	  analyse	  in	  
any	  depth	  except	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  philosophical	  
and	  practical	  boundaries	  that	  start	  to	  be	  blurred.	  	  
More	  radically,	  and	  in	  the	  international	  context	  that	  
is	  beyond	  Belgium,	  bioethicists	  Wilkinson	  and	  
Savulescu	  (2012:	  41)	  have	  already	  hypothesised	  that	  
‘organ	  donation	  euthanasia’	  –	  that	  is,	  removal	  of	  
organs,	  such	  as	  the	  heart,	  which	  causes	  death	  -­‐	  
would	  be	  a	  ‘rational	  improvement’	  and	  way	  of	  
increasing	  transplant	  supply.	  They	  pose	  the	  
question:	  ‘why	  should	  surgeons	  have	  to	  wait	  until	  
the	  patient	  has	  died	  as	  a	  result	  of	  withdrawal	  of	  life	  
support	  or	  even	  simple	  life	  prolonging	  medical	  
treatment?’	  They	  suggest	  a	  ‘viable’	  alternative	  would	  
be	  to	  anaesthetise	  patients	  and	  hasten	  death	  by	  the	  
process	  of	  removing	  organs	  from	  their	  body	  
(Wilkinson	  &	  Suvalescu,	  2012:	  41).	  Of	  course,	  they	  
suggest	  some	  safeguards	  around	  this	  proposal,	  
however,	  the	  suggestion	  of	  seeing	  euthanasia	  as	  a	  
vehicle	  and	  opportunity	  for	  organ	  donation	  raises	  
complex	  ethical	  and	  practical	  questions.	  
Collectively	  these	  sources	  paint	  a	  more	  troubled	  
account	  of	  the	  Belgian	  experience	  than	  intimated	  by	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013).	  The	  same	  appears	  to	  be	  
true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  
	  
The	  Netherlands:	  Evidence	  of	  Non-­‐
voluntary	  Euthanasia	  for	  Vulnerable	  
Patients	  and	  the	  ‘Dark	  Figure’	  of	  
Euthanasia	  
Interestingly,	  and	  much	  like	  the	  example	  of	  Belgium,	  
the	  paragraphs	  that	  follow	  are	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  
the	  differences	  between	  euthanasia	  as	  policy	  and	  
euthanasia	  in	  practice.	  As	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
(2013)	  continually	  refer	  to	  the	  Netherlands	  
throughout	  their	  paper	  and	  base	  substantial	  
portions	  of	  their	  proposed	  model	  on	  that	  of	  the	  
Netherlands,	  the	  Dutch	  experience	  warrants	  close	  
scrutiny	  here.	  It	  seems	  that	  some	  important	  issues	  
are	  missing	  from	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  
analysis	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  Netherlands.	  These	  relate	  
to	  concrete	  examples	  of	  ‘bracket	  creep’.	  	  
The	  ‘dark	  figure’	  of	  crime	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  metaphor	  
in	  criminology	  to	  describe	  the	  real	  extent	  of	  crime	  
(outside	  of	  or	  beyond	  official	  statistics)	  that	  remains	  
undetected	  and/or	  unreported	  or	  underreported	  
(see	  White	  &	  Perrone,	  2010:	  27).	  In	  this,	  the	  role	  of	  
criminological	  and	  sociological	  research	  is	  to	  
supplement	  official	  statistics,	  which	  are	  limited,	  
through	  a	  range	  of	  other	  measures	  to	  gather	  a	  real	  
picture	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  to	  counteract	  the	  problem	  
of	  omission	  and	  underreporting.	  Although	  in	  a	  
different	  context,	  this	  ‘dark	  figure’	  metaphor	  can	  also	  
be	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  hidden	  
euthanasia	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  This	  issue	  has	  been	  
raised	  since	  the	  legalisation	  of	  euthanasia	  there,	  with	  
Sheldon	  (2003:	  1164)	  alerting	  readers	  of	  the	  British	  
Medical	  Journal	  to	  a	  Dutch	  Government	  study	  which	  
found	  that	  ‘only	  half	  of	  Dutch	  doctors	  report	  
euthanasia.’	  Lower	  figures	  have	  since	  been	  put	  
forward.	  In	  2010,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  23%	  of	  
euthanasia	  cases	  were	  not	  reported	  to	  euthanasia	  
review	  committees	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  (Onwuteaka-­‐
Philipsen	  et	  al.,	  2012:	  6).	  Underreporting	  rates	  in	  
Flanders,	  Belgium,	  appear	  to	  be	  higher;	  available	  
evidence	  suggests	  that	  only	  one	  out	  of	  two	  
euthanasia	  cases	  is	  reported	  (Smets	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013:	  44)	  suggest	  that	  there	  
are	  numerous	  cases	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  where	  the	  
first	  attempt	  at	  assisted	  suicide	  may	  have	  failed,	  and	  
required	  doctors’	  intervention	  to	  hasten	  death.	  
Citing	  a	  2010	  annual	  report	  from	  the	  Dutch	  Regional	  
Euthanasia	  Review	  Committee,	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  
44	  cases	  involving	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  assisted	  
suicide	  and	  euthanasia,	  but	  very	  little	  is	  known	  
about	  how	  and	  why	  this	  occurred.	  They	  conclude	  
that	  ‘it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  
the	  doctor	  was	  required	  to	  intervene	  and	  perform	  
euthanasia	  if	  the	  patient’s	  attempt	  at	  assisted	  suicide	  
was	  not	  successful’	  (Giddings	  &	  McKim,	  2013:	  44).	  	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  under-­‐reporting	  mentioned	  earlier,	  
this	  is	  concerning.	  A	  lot	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  known	  
about	  ‘assisted	  suicide	  fail	  rates’	  in	  other	  
jurisdictions	  and	  how	  these	  are	  recognised	  and	  
VOLUNTARY	  EUTHANASIA	  AND	  ‘ASSISTED	  DYING’	  IN	  TASMANIA:	  A	  RESPONSE	  TO	  GIDDINGS	  &	  McKIM	  
	  
21	  
responded	  to,	  both	  immediately	  with	  individual	  
patients	  and	  structurally	  in	  terms	  of	  law	  and	  
healthcare.	  For	  example,	  Oregon	  annual	  reports	  
provide	  statistics	  of	  cases	  of	  patients	  regaining	  
consciousness	  after	  an	  ‘assisted	  suicide’	  attempt,	  
with	  some	  living	  for	  days	  and	  even	  months	  after	  and	  
being	  listed	  as	  dying	  of	  other	  causes	  (Oregon	  Public	  
Health	  Division,	  2011,	  2012,	  2013).	  
Dutch	  Neonatal	  Euthanasia	  	  
In	  his	  analysis	  and	  rebuttal	  of	  arguments	  for	  the	  
decriminalisation	  of	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide,	  
John	  Keown	  (Jackson	  &	  Keown,	  2012:	  100-­‐101)	  uses	  
the	  example	  of	  the	  Netherlands	  to	  argue	  how	  
legalising	  such	  practices	  no	  longer	  becomes	  a	  private	  
matter	  concerning	  only	  a	  few	  highly	  autonomous	  
patients,	  but	  instead	  ‘it	  clearly	  has	  profound	  
ramifications	  for	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  all	  patients	  who	  
might	  be	  judged	  ‘better	  off	  dead’,	  not	  least	  those	  who	  
are	  unable	  to	  refuse	  it.’	  In	  this	  vein,	  Pitcher	  (2010)	  
raises	  the	  pertinent	  question	  of	  ‘how	  do	  around	  
1,000	  people	  come	  to	  be	  put	  to	  death	  in	  Holland	  per	  
year	  without	  having	  made	  a	  request	  to	  die?’	  The	  
answer	  from	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Dutch	  Ministry	  
of	  Health	  is	  troubling:	  
There	  are	  some	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  careful	  
euthanasia,	  but	  in	  most	  cases	  are	  people	  who	  are	  
not	  able	  to	  make	  a	  request	  because	  they	  are	  not	  
seen	  as	  able	  to	  make	  a	  request	  –	  for	  instance,	  
people	  who	  are	  suffering	  from	  a	  psychiatric	  
disease	  or	  people	  who	  are	  in	  a	  coma.	  Also,	  
newborn	  babies	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  making	  a	  
request	  (Keizer,	  2005	  cited	  in	  Pitcher,	  2010:	  66)	  
The	  Netherlands	  has	  attracted	  criticism	  for	  its	  
approach	  to	  euthanasia	  of	  people	  with	  a	  mental	  
illness	  (Kissane	  &	  Kelly,	  2000).	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
(2013:	  33)	  concede	  that	  there	  are	  reported	  cases	  of	  
patients	  with	  a	  mental	  illness	  or	  disorder	  accessing	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  or	  assisted	  suicide	  under	  the	  
Dutch	  model;	  however,	  in	  their	  paper	  they	  arguably	  
understate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  occurs.	  
The	  ‘slippery	  slope’	  argument	  from	  voluntary	  to	  
non-­‐voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  from	  competent	  to	  
vulnerable	  and	  incompetent	  patients	  has	  received	  
some	  credence	  from	  other	  quarters.	  Ardent	  defender	  
of	  euthanasia	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Professor	  John	  
Griffiths,	  himself	  concedes	  the	  link	  between	  the	  
legalisation	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  the	  process	  
of	  legalising	  non-­‐voluntary	  euthanasia	  of	  vulnerable	  
people,	  in	  this	  case	  infanticide	  or	  what	  the	  Dutch	  call	  
‘neonatal	  euthanasia’	  for	  infants:	  	  
The	  applicable	  norms	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  have	  
assuredly	  changed	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  open	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  termination	  of	  
life	  of	  severely	  defective	  newborn	  babies...	  [T]he	  
influence	  on	  these	  changes	  of	  the	  way	  
euthanasia	  had	  earlier	  been	  legalised	  and	  
regulated	  is	  obvious.	  In	  this	  sense,	  one	  might	  
speak	  of	  a	  normative	  slippery	  slope.	  (Griffiths	  et	  
al.,	  2008:	  252	  cited	  in	  Jackson	  &	  Keown,	  2012:	  
100).	  
Laing	  (2013:	  339)	  also	  reaches	  this	  conclusion	  of	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  clear	  ‘slippery	  slope’	  in	  her	  critique	  of	  
infanticide	  and	  the	  approach	  of	  ‘eliminating	  
suffering	  by	  eliminating	  the	  sufferers’	  in	  the	  
Netherlands.	  	  
Still	  greater	  concerns	  arise	  when	  it	  is	  understood	  
what	  is	  now	  acceptable	  ethical	  practice	  in	  the	  
Netherlands	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ‘The	  
Groningen	  Protocol’	  (Verhagen	  &	  Sauer,	  2005).	  The	  
grounds	  for	  euthanasing	  an	  infant	  through	  ‘post-­‐
birth	  abortion’	  or	  ‘neonatal	  euthanasia’	  have	  now	  
been	  documented	  to	  extend	  to	  doctors	  hastening	  
death	  because	  of	  severe	  disability	  and	  suffering,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  capacity	  to	  ‘deliberately	  end	  the	  life	  of	  
physiologically	  stable	  newborns	  with	  lethal	  drugs	  
that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  have	  died’	  (Verhagen,	  
2013:	  293).	  The	  extent	  of	  actual	  practice	  is	  unknown	  
as	  there	  are	  significant	  issues	  with	  underreporting;	  
even	  an	  advocate	  of	  this	  practice	  and	  architect	  of	  the	  
protocol,	  Verhagen	  (2013)	  estimated	  that	  only	  15-­‐
20%	  of	  neonatal	  euthanasia	  cases	  are	  reported.	  The	  
Royal	  Dutch	  Medical	  Association	  (the	  ‘KNMG’)	  
(2013)	  have	  recently	  estimated	  that	  palliative	  care	  
and	  infant	  euthanasia	  could	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  end	  of	  
life	  care	  and	  deaths	  of	  approximately	  650	  Dutch	  
infants	  a	  year,	  issuing	  medical	  guidelines	  relating	  to	  
these	  practices.	  
The	  killing	  of	  terminally	  ill	  or	  disabled	  infants,	  or	  
just	  those	  with	  a	  prognosis	  that	  is	  ‘very	  grim’	  
(Verhagen,	  2013:	  293)	  has	  attracted	  strong	  criticism	  
(see	  Kon,	  2007,	  2008;	  Kodish,	  2008;	  Jotkowitz	  et	  al.,	  







Child	  Euthanasia	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  
Euthanasia	  is	  also	  relevant	  at	  the	  other	  end	  of	  
childhood.	  In	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  age	  of	  consent	  
regarding	  voluntary	  participation	  in	  euthanasia	  has	  
been	  lowered	  to	  allow	  children	  aged	  12	  years	  or	  
older	  to	  consent	  to	  being	  euthanased,	  providing	  
their	  parents	  also	  consent.	  Documented	  cases	  of	  
physician-­‐assisted	  dying	  for	  children	  in	  the	  
Netherlands	  include:	  a	  16	  year	  old	  with	  an	  
autoimmune	  disease,	  an	  18	  month	  old	  child	  with	  
epilepsy	  and	  a	  progressive	  neurodegenerative	  
disease,	  and	  a	  13	  year	  old	  with	  leukaemia	  (Vrakking	  
et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  extension	  of	  euthanasia	  to	  children	  
and	  infants	  may	  not	  be	  isolated	  to	  the	  Netherlands	  
for	  much	  longer	  since	  the	  legalisation	  of	  similar	  
practices	  are	  being	  considered	  in	  Belgium	  (Pousset	  
et	  al.,	  2011;	  De	  Morgen,	  2013).	  There	  are,	  however,	  
research	  findings	  that	  indicate	  that	  neonatal	  
euthanasia	  is	  already	  occurring	  in	  the	  Flanders	  
region	  of	  Belgium	  at	  rates	  similar	  to	  the	  Netherlands,	  
(Vrakking	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  (a)	  Giddings	  and	  
McKim	  (2013)	  acknowledge	  the	  developments	  
described	  above	  concerning	  children	  and	  (b)	  their	  
proposed	  model	  does	  not	  include	  minors.	  The	  point	  
we	  want	  to	  underscore	  is	  that	  over	  time	  significant	  
‘bracket	  creep’	  has	  indeed	  occurred	  in	  the	  
Netherlands,	  as	  it	  has	  in	  Belgium.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  
assurances	  that,	  if	  legalised,	  euthanasia	  systems	  in	  
Tasmania	  or	  Australia	  would	  not	  also	  extend	  their	  
scope	  over	  time.	  
	  
Oregon:	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  Illness	  
and	  Financially	  Disadvantaged	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Physician	  assisted	  suicide	  (PAS)	  has	  been	  legally	  
available	  in	  Oregon	  since	  1997.	  According	  to	  the	  
Oregon	  Public	  Health	  Division	  (2012),	  since	  1997	  
when	  the	  law	  was	  passed,	  a	  total	  of	  1,050	  people	  
have	  received	  prescriptions	  for	  lethal	  drugs	  and	  673	  
patients	  have	  died	  from	  ingesting	  medications	  
prescribed	  under	  Oregon’s	  Death	  With	  Dignity	  Act.	  	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  and	  others	  (White	  &	  
Willmott,	  2012)	  have	  provided	  their	  own	  detailed	  
analysis	  of	  past	  and	  present	  laws	  and	  practices	  in	  
Oregon,	  upholding	  it	  as	  a	  positive	  example	  of	  how	  
assisted	  suicide	  laws	  can	  be	  safely	  and	  successfully	  
implemented.	  However,	  they	  have	  not	  sufficiently	  
recognised	  two	  important	  issues	  in	  protecting	  or	  
failing	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  people.	  The	  first	  issue	  
relates	  to	  how	  legalising	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide	  affects	  people	  with	  a	  mental	  illness	  
and	  those	  experiencing	  psychological	  distress.	  The	  
second	  issue	  arises	  from	  examples	  of	  what	  some	  
might	  consider	  unethical	  decision-­‐making	  and	  a	  
failure	  of	  duty	  of	  care	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Oregonian	  
health	  authorities	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  vulnerable	  patients.	  
Levene	  and	  Parker	  (2011:	  205)	  explain	  why	  mental	  
illness	  in	  general,	  and	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  in	  
particular,	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  and	  concern.	  
They	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  depression	  is	  ‘potentially	  
reversible’	  and	  ‘may	  affect	  the	  patients’	  competency’	  
as	  well	  as	  their	  own	  assessments	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  
their	  life	  and	  their	  desire	  to	  live.	  They	  recommend	  
that,	  because	  depressed	  patients	  and	  other	  patients	  
with	  a	  mental	  illness	  are	  considered	  a	  vulnerable	  
population,	  ‘their	  request	  for	  death	  may	  be	  part	  of	  
their	  illness,	  with	  the	  correct	  response	  being	  
treatment	  rather	  than	  assistance	  in	  dying’	  (Levene	  &	  
Parker,	  2011:	  205).	  	  
Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013:	  32)	  proposed	  model	  
suggests	  that	  people	  with	  depression	  or	  other	  
psychiatric	  or	  psychological	  disorders	  would	  be	  
ineligible	  for	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide.	  Yet,	  evidence	  from	  Oregon	  suggests	  that	  
such	  safeguards	  will	  not	  stop	  patients	  with	  
depression	  successfully	  accessing	  assisted	  suicide	  
(Schwartz,	  2004;	  Hamilton	  &	  Hamilton,	  2005).	  These	  
issues	  warrant	  further	  consideration	  in	  the	  
paragraphs	  that	  follow.	  
Tolle	  and	  colleagues	  (2004)	  conducted	  extensive	  
research	  on	  the	  characteristics	  and	  demographics	  of	  
dying	  Oregonians	  considering	  physician	  assisted	  
suicide.	  	  Within	  this,	  they	  found	  that	  mental	  illness	  
and	  psychological	  symptoms	  were	  implicated	  as	  
factors	  in	  thinking	  about	  and	  wanting	  assisted	  
suicide:	  
The	  role	  of	  pain	  and	  psychological	  symptoms	  on	  
PAS	  consideration	  is	  controversial.	  Pain	  has	  been	  
associated	  with	  a	  desire	  for	  hastened	  death	  
(Chochinov	  et	  al.,	  1994),	  but	  most	  researchers	  
emphasize	  the	  greater	  contribution	  of	  depression	  
and/or	  hopelessness	  (Ganzini	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  We	  
found	  that	  greater	  overall	  symptom	  distress	  
independently	  predicted	  personal	  consideration	  of	  
PAS.	  Those	  who	  considered	  PAS	  also	  were	  reported	  
VOLUNTARY	  EUTHANASIA	  AND	  ‘ASSISTED	  DYING’	  IN	  TASMANIA:	  A	  RESPONSE	  TO	  GIDDINGS	  &	  McKIM	  
	  
23	  
to	  experience	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  symptoms,	  with	  
pain	  and	  sadness	  most	  strongly	  associated	  with	  PAS	  
consideration	  (Tolle	  et	  al.,	  2004:	  116).	  
In	  the	  years	  after	  this	  research	  was	  published,	  other	  
researchers	  began	  conducting	  studies	  about	  the	  role	  
of	  mental	  illness	  and	  its	  links	  with	  people	  seeking	  
voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide.	  	  
In	  2008,	  a	  much	  cited	  article	  in	  the	  prestigious	  
British	  Medical	  Journal	  brought	  this	  issue	  to	  the	  fore.	  
Ganzini,	  Goy	  and	  Dobscha	  (2008)	  conducted	  a	  cross-­‐
sectional	  survey	  in	  Oregon	  to	  determine	  the	  
prevalence	  of	  depression	  and	  anxiety	  in	  terminally	  
ill	  patients	  pursuing	  assisted	  suicide.	  	  
Importantly,	  Ganzini	  and	  colleagues	  (2008)	  
found	  that,	  among	  terminally	  ill	  Oregonian	  
patients	  who	  participated	  in	  their	  study:	  	  
1. Of	  those	  who	  requested	  physician	  assisted	  
suicide,	  one	  in	  four	  had	  clinical	  depression;	  	  
2. Of	  those	  who	  received	  a	  prescription	  for	  a	  
lethal	  drug,	  one	  in	  six	  had	  clinical	  
depression.	  
While	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  patients	  in	  
their	  study	  did	  not	  have	  depression,	  they	  (2008:	  1)	  
concluded	  that	  ‘the	  current	  practice	  of	  the	  Death	  
with	  Dignity	  Act	  may	  fail	  to	  protect	  some	  patients	  
whose	  choices	  are	  influenced	  by	  depression	  from	  
receiving	  a	  prescription	  for	  a	  lethal	  drug.’	  
In	  the	  same	  year,	  Hendin	  and	  Foley	  (2008)	  
published	  details	  of	  six	  cases	  of	  vulnerable	  patients	  
who	  were	  euthanased.	  Their	  analysis	  suggested	  that	  
safeguards	  were	  being	  ignored	  by	  doctors,	  especially	  
in	  cases	  where	  the	  patient	  had	  a	  mental	  illness,	  and	  
that	  the	  Oregonian	  Death	  with	  Dignity	  Law	  does	  not	  
protect	  vulnerable	  patients.	  	  
In	  light	  of	  this	  and	  other	  research	  studies,	  Levene	  
and	  Parker	  (2011)	  conducted	  a	  systematic	  review	  of	  
the	  prevalence	  of	  depression	  in	  granted	  and	  refused	  
requests	  for	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  in	  
Oregon	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  They	  expressed	  
concern	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  psychiatrists	  to	  
confidently	  assess	  the	  existence	  and	  role	  of	  mental	  
illness	  in	  the	  case	  of	  patients	  requesting	  physician	  
assisted	  suicide	  (PAS),	  citing	  research	  that	  ‘only	  6%	  
of	  Oregonian	  psychiatrists	  felt	  they	  could	  assess	  
whether	  psychiatric	  factors	  were	  affecting	  a	  
patients’	  judgment	  in	  a	  PAS	  request	  during	  a	  single	  
consultation’	  (Levene	  &	  Parker,	  2011:	  210).	  	  They	  
(2011:	  210)	  concluded	  that	  ‘up	  to	  half	  of	  all	  patients	  
requesting	  euthanasia/	  physician	  assisted	  suicide	  
may	  show	  symptoms	  of	  depression.’	  	  
The	  authors	  of	  this	  paper	  examined	  the	  official	  
statistics	  in	  the	  annual	  reports	  from	  Oregon	  Public	  
Health	  –	  see	  Table	  3	  –	  to	  assess	  referrals	  for	  
psychiatric	  evaluation.	  It	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  
suggest	  that	  in	  recent	  years,	  when	  less	  than	  4%	  of	  
Death	  with	  Dignity	  Act	  patients	  were	  referred	  to	  a	  
psychiatrist,	  that	  the	  prevalence	  of	  mental	  illness	  
and	  psychiatric	  symptoms	  remain	  largely	  unknown	  
and	  unmonitored.	  Martyn	  and	  Bourguignon	  (2000)	  
have	  criticised	  Oregon’s	  data	  collection	  and	  
regulation	  in	  this	  area	  in	  detail.	  
Table	  3:	  	  Percentage	  (%)	  of	  Oregonian	  Death	  with	  
Dignity	  Act	  (DWDA)	  Patients	  Referred	  for	  Psychiatric	  
Evaluation	  –	  Trends	  Over	  Time	  
Year	   Percentage	  (%)	  	  DWDA	  patients	  
referred	  for	  psychiatric	  evaluation	  
1998	   31%	  
1999	   37%	  
2000	   19%	  
2001	   14%	  
2002	   13%	  
2003	   5%	  
2004	   5%	  
2005	   5%	  
2006	   4%	  
2007	   0%	  
2008	   3%	  
2009	   0%	  
2010	   1%	  
2011	   1%	  
2012	   2%	  
Sources:	  Oregon	  Public	  Health	  (2001;	  2002;	  2003;	  2004;	  
2005;	  2006;	  2007;	  2008;	  2009;	  2010;	  2011;	  2012;	  2013).	  	  
This	  data	  and	  the	  other	  empirical	  studies	  from	  the	  
literature	  discussed	  here	  provide	  evidence	  that	  the	  
legal	  safeguards	  in	  Oregonian	  law	  may	  not	  protect	  
vulnerable	  people	  with	  a	  mental	  illness	  and,	  in	  some	  
cases,	  may	  have	  been	  deliberately	  breached.	  There	  
are	  also	  concerns	  that	  ‘bracket	  creep’	  may	  occur	  by	  
officially	  expanding	  the	  eligibility	  criteria	  and	  laws	  
to	  allow	  people	  with	  a	  mental	  illness	  to	  access	  




35)	  and	  Lewis	  and	  Black	  (2012)	  acknowledge	  that	  
there	  have	  been	  lobbying	  attempts	  and	  campaigns,	  
as	  well	  as	  proposed	  legislation,	  seeking	  to	  expand	  
the	  Oregon	  Act	  to	  allow	  for	  patients	  with	  a	  mental	  
illness	  to	  access	  physician	  assisted	  suicide.	  This	  
attempt	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  was	  recently	  voted	  
down	  by	  the	  Oregon	  legislature.	  (Attempts	  have	  also	  
been	  made	  to	  expand	  the	  Swiss	  system	  to	  
incorporate	  suffering	  based	  on	  mental	  illness	  
(Prichard,	  2012).)	  
However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  system	  in	  the	  
Netherlands	  was	  expanded	  in	  2002	  to	  permit	  access	  
to	  euthanasia	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  psychiatric	  illness,	  
providing	  the	  patient	  is	  suffering	  hopelessly	  and	  
unbearably	  (Pereira,	  2011).	  A	  similar	  situation	  exists	  
in	  Belgium.	  	  
The	  second	  issue	  warranting	  brief	  mention	  here	  is	  
the	  risks	  of	  legalising	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  
assisted	  suicide	  to	  people	  living	  with	  socio-­‐economic	  
disadvantage	  and	  poverty,	  who	  are	  typically	  
considered	  a	  vulnerable	  group	  in	  society.	  Research	  
on	  Oregon	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  by	  Battin	  and	  
colleagues	  (2007)	  (whom	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
(2013)	  cite	  extensively)	  concluded	  that	  people	  on	  
low	  incomes	  and	  from	  socio-­‐economically	  
disadvantaged	  backgrounds	  were	  not	  at	  heightened	  
risk	  in	  terms	  of	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  
suicide.	  This	  has	  since	  been	  challenged	  by	  Page	  
(2009)	  and	  Finlay	  and	  George	  (2010).	  	  
In	  an	  article	  titled	  ‘What’s	  the	  Cost	  of	  Living	  in	  
Oregon	  These	  Days?	  –	  A	  Fresh	  Look	  at	  the	  Need	  for	  
Judicial	  Protections	  in	  the	  Death	  with	  Dignity	  Act’,	  
Page	  (2009)	  highlights	  two	  vignettes	  of	  vulnerable	  
patients	  in	  Oregon.	  Page	  (2009)	  describes	  Barbara	  
Wagner’s	  story.	  She	  was	  a	  64	  year	  old,	  low	  income	  
Oregon	  resident	  who	  learned	  that	  her	  cancer,	  after	  
two	  years	  in	  remission,	  had	  returned.	  Her	  doctor	  
wrote	  a	  prescription	  for	  a	  cancer	  treatment.	  In	  May	  
2008,	  Ms	  Wagner	  received	  a	  letter	  to	  inform	  her	  that	  
the	  funding	  for	  her	  prescription	  had	  been	  denied.	  
Instead,	  ‘the	  Oregon	  Health	  Plan	  offered	  her	  funding	  
for	  comfort	  care	  that	  included	  the	  option	  of	  lethal	  
prescription.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  letter,	  Ms	  Wagner	  
said	  “To	  say	  to	  someone,	  we’ll	  pay	  for	  you	  to	  die,	  but	  
not	  for	  you	  to	  live,	  it’s	  cruel…”’	  (Page,	  2009:	  233).	  	  
In	  a	  very	  similar	  case,	  Oregonian	  resident	  Randy	  
Stroup,	  aged	  53,	  was	  uninsured	  and	  unable	  to	  pay	  
for	  expensive	  chemotherapy.	  He	  was	  informed	  that	  
his	  treatment	  under	  the	  Oregon	  Health	  Plan	  had	  
been	  denied,	  and	  ‘likewise,	  learned	  that	  the	  State	  
would	  offer	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  lethal	  prescription’	  (Page,	  
2009:	  233).	  In	  discussing	  Randy	  Stroup’s	  case,	  Dr	  
William	  Toffner,	  professor	  of	  family	  at	  Oregon	  
Health	  and	  Science	  University,	  said	  ‘“It	  is	  chilling	  
when	  you	  think	  about	  it.	  It	  absolutely	  conveys	  to	  the	  
patient	  that	  continued	  living	  isn’t	  worthwhile”’	  
(Springer,	  2008).	  
After	  much	  national	  and	  international	  publicity,	  both	  
Ms	  Wagner	  and	  Mr	  Stroup	  subsequently	  had	  their	  
medication	  and	  treatment	  requests	  reconsidered	  
and	  the	  State	  offered	  to	  pay	  for	  their	  life	  prolonging	  
treatment	  and	  palliative	  care	  if	  desired	  (Page,	  2009).	  
Page,	  however,	  concludes	  that	  these	  two	  stories	  
reveal	  a	  truth	  about	  Oregon’s	  Death	  With	  Dignity	  Act	  
–	  ‘its	  safeguards	  are	  inadequate’	  (Page,	  2009:	  233).	  
In	  summary,	  there	  is	  evidence	  from	  Oregon	  that	  
contrasts	  sharply	  with	  the	  portrayal	  of	  best	  practice	  
outlined	  by	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013).	  In	  
particular,	  documented	  cases	  of	  people	  with	  a	  
mental	  illness	  and	  people	  living	  with	  socio-­‐economic	  
disadvantage	  highlight	  that	  the	  safeguards	  in	  
Oregon’s	  Death	  With	  Dignity	  Act	  do	  not	  adequately	  
protect	  vulnerable	  people.	  	  
	  
Ireland:	  Euthanasia	  Law	  Reform	  is	  
Against	  the	  Public	  Interest	  
Voluntary	  euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  has	  
recently	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  extensive	  debate	  in	  
Ireland,	  due	  to	  a	  much	  publicised	  court	  case.	  The	  
case	  was	  initiated	  by	  Marie	  Fleming,	  a	  59	  year	  old	  
woman	  with	  multiple	  sclerosis	  who	  was	  immobile	  
from	  the	  neck	  down.	  She	  wished	  to	  participate	  in	  
assisted	  suicide	  and	  be	  allowed	  to	  die	  at	  home	  at	  a	  
time	  of	  her	  choosing.	  Marie	  mounted	  a	  legal	  
challenge	  to	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  Ireland’s	  law	  
that	  prevented	  her	  from	  being	  assisted	  to	  commit	  
suicide.	  The	  High	  Court	  of	  Ireland	  in	  Fleming	  v	  
Ireland	  &	  Ors	  [2013]	  IEHC	  2	  considered	  and	  rejected	  
her	  claim.	  The	  court’s	  judgment	  cited	  a	  number	  of	  
issues	  and	  reasons	  which	  are	  summarised	  here:	  	  
• Competent	  adult	  patients	  already	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
refuse	  medical	  treatment,	  even	  if	  this	  leads	  to	  
death;	  
• Legalising	  or	  relaxing	  the	  ban	  on	  voluntary	  
euthanasia	  and	  assisted	  suicide	  was	  ‘inimical	  to	  the	  
public	  interest’;	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• ‘Any	  relaxation	  of	  the	  ban	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  
tailor	  to	  individual	  cases’;	  
• ‘The	  evidence	  from	  other	  countries	  shows	  that	  
risks	  of	  abuse	  are	  all	  too	  real	  and	  cannot	  be	  
dismissed	  as	  speculative	  or	  distant’;	  
• ‘One	  real	  risk	  attending	  such	  liberalisation	  is	  that	  
even	  with	  the	  most	  rigorous	  system	  of	  legislative	  
checks	  and	  safeguards,	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  aged,	  the	  disabled,	  the	  poor,	  the	  
unwanted,	  the	  rejected,	  the	  lonely,	  the	  impulsive,	  
the	  financially	  compromised	  and	  emotionally	  
vulnerable	  would	  not	  avail	  of	  this	  option	  in	  order	  
to	  avoid	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  burden	  on	  their	  family	  
and	  society’;	  
• ‘The	  safeguards	  built	  into	  any	  liberalised	  system	  
would,	  furthermore,	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  laxity	  and	  
complacency	  and	  might	  well	  prove	  difficult	  or	  even	  
impossible	  to	  police	  adequately’;	  
• ‘The	  Court	  further	  notes	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  other	  
similar	  statutory	  bans	  has	  been	  upheld	  by	  the	  
Canadian	  Supreme	  Court,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court,	  
the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  
Human	  Rights.’	  
In	  Fleming	  v	  Ireland	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Ireland	  
referenced	  the	  high	  profile	  Canadian	  case	  Carter	  v.	  
Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  2012	  BCSC	  886.	  This	  is	  
directly	  relevant	  here	  because	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  
(2013)	  refer	  to	  the	  Canadian	  case	  several	  times	  in	  
their	  paper.	  The	  High	  Court	  of	  Ireland	  stated	  that,	  in	  
reviewing	  the	  same	  available	  international	  evidence,	  
it	  ‘has	  drawn	  exactly	  the	  opposite	  conclusions.’	  The	  
High	  Court	  summary	  of	  the	  judgment	  directly	  
mentions	  some	  of	  the	  evidence	  and	  issues	  that	  have	  
been	  covered	  in	  this	  paper	  as	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  
judgment	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  Fleming’s	  
constitutional	  claim:	  
The	  medical	  literature	  documents	  specific	  examples	  
of	  abuse	  which,	  even	  if	  exceptional,	  are	  nonetheless	  
deeply	  disturbing.	  Moreover,	  contrary	  to	  the	  views	  
of	  the	  Canadian	  court,	  there	  is	  evidence	  from	  this	  
literature	  that	  certain	  groups	  (such	  as	  disabled	  
neonates	  and	  disabled	  or	  demented	  elderly	  
persons)	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  abuse.	  Above	  all,	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  number	  of	  LAWER	  (“legally	  assisted	  deaths	  
without	  explicit	  request”)	  cases	  remains	  strikingly	  
high	  in	  jurisdictions	  which	  have	  liberalised	  their	  
law	  on	  assisted	  suicide	  (Switzerland,	  Netherlands	  
and	  Belgium)	  –	  ranging	  from	  0.4%	  to	  over	  1%	  of	  all	  
deaths	  in	  these	  jurisdictions	  according	  to	  the	  latest	  
figures	  –	  without	  any	  obvious	  official	  response	  
speaks	  for	  itself	  as	  to	  the	  risks	  involved.	  For	  these	  
reasons,	  the	  Court	  rejects	  the	  constitutional	  claim.	  	  
Marie	  Fleming	  appealed	  this	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Ireland,	  citing	  issues	  of	  discrimination	  relating	  to	  
disability.	  On	  29	  April	  2013,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
Ireland	  dismissed	  her	  appeal	  and	  upheld	  the	  
judgment	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  (Fleming	  v	  Ireland	  &	  Ors	  
[2013]	  IESC	  19).	  The	  issues	  highlighted	  in	  Fleming	  v	  
Ireland	  support	  broader	  international	  concerns	  
regarding	  ‘bracket	  creep’	  and	  a	  ‘slippery	  slope’	  as	  
well	  as	  underscoring	  the	  potential	  for	  undue	  risks	  
for	  vulnerable	  people.	  
In	  summary,	  the	  alternative	  and	  additional	  
international	  evidence	  and	  experiences	  presented	  
here	  raise	  ethical	  questions	  about	  euthanasia	  law	  
reform.	  They	  demonstrate	  why	  questions	  relating	  to	  
‘bracket	  creep’	  remain.	  Such	  questions	  and	  the	  
potential	  for	  serious	  risks	  and	  harms	  are	  not	  as	  
unfounded	  as	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  might	  
suggest.	  If	  euthanasia	  is	  legalised	  in	  Tasmania	  it	  is	  
highly	  likely	  that	  there	  will	  at	  some	  stage	  be	  debate	  
about	  changes	  to	  and	  extension	  of	  eligibility	  criteria.	  
‘Safeguards’	  do	  not	  effectively	  avert	  concerns	  about	  
bracket	  creep,	  especially	  if	  social	  change	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
main	  reasons	  cited	  as	  the	  grounds	  for	  euthanasia	  
law	  reform	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  






Despite	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  (2013)	  confidence	  
about	  euthanasia	  as	  a	  policy	  option	  for	  Tasmania,	  it	  
seems	  to	  us	  that	  the	  case	  for	  voluntary	  euthanasia	  
and	  assisted	  suicide	  in	  Tasmania	  is	  far	  from	  being	  
made	  out.	  	  
A	  primary	  concern	  about	  Giddings	  and	  McKim’s	  
(2013)	  paper	  is	  that	  it	  appears	  to	  assess	  available	  
evidence	  optimistically	  and	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  
euthanasia	  advocates.	  Our	  paper	  has	  attempted	  to	  
explain	  that	  the	  few	  jurisdictions	  that	  have	  legalised	  
euthanasia	  have	  complex	  legacies	  and	  fallible	  
safeguards.	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  these	  complexities	  have	  
been	  understated	  in	  the	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013)	  
paper.	  	  
Like	  others,	  we	  hold	  grave	  concerns	  about	  the	  
mixture	  of	  roles	  and	  social	  messages	  entailed	  in	  
legalising	  euthanasia,	  including	  those	  relating	  to	  the	  
doctor-­‐patient	  relationship	  as	  well	  as	  perceptions	  of	  
Tasmanians	  with	  physical	  disabilities.	  We	  are	  
equally	  concerned	  about	  the	  extension	  of	  eligibility	  
requirements	  (e.g	  bracket	  creep),	  especially	  through	  
reinterpretations	  of	  terms	  including	  ‘poor	  quality	  of	  
life’	  and	  ‘unbearable	  suffering’.	  
Based	  on	  the	  evidence	  and	  experiences	  presented	  in	  
this	  paper,	  we	  conclude	  that	  there	  are	  unjustifiable	  
risks	  in	  proceeding	  with	  the	  euthanasia	  law	  reform	  
proposed	  by	  Giddings	  and	  McKim	  (2013).	  
Irrespective	  of	  the	  success	  or	  otherwise	  of	  their	  bid,	  
much	  more	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  become	  better	  
informed	  about	  the	  issues,	  processes	  and	  practices	  
discussed	  in	  this	  paper,	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  best	  
understood	  in	  the	  Tasmanian	  and	  Australian	  
context.	  In	  the	  interests	  of	  fostering	  further	  
knowledge	  exchange,	  we	  hope	  that	  others	  take	  up	  
analysis	  and	  discussion	  of	  what	  we	  have	  presented	  
here.	  More	  diverse	  voices	  and	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  
community	  stakeholders	  need	  to	  be	  heard	  on	  this	  
important	  issue.	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